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OMISSION SUSPICION: JURIES, HEARSAY, 
AND ATTORNEYS’ STRATEGIC CHOICES 
JUSTIN SEVIER*
ABSTRACT
 Attorneys understand that presenting evidence consists of a series of strategic choices. 
Yet legal scholars have not studied whether jurors are sensitive to the trial strategy that 
underlies those choices. Do jurors question why an attorney has omitted what jurors  
consider the “best” evidence of some trial fact and has instead put forth weaker evidence? Do 
they attempt to understand the motivation behind that choice, and does that affect their  
legal judgments? 
 Six original experiments explore these questions in the context of hearsay evidence. The 
experiments reveal a ubiquitous finding: Jurors carefully scrutinize a party’s strategy for 
presenting hearsay, and this has a substantial impact on their verdicts. Moreover, jurors 
scrutinize an attorney’s strategic decision to proffer hearsay regardless of the identity of the 
legal actor, regardless of the type of case, and regardless of the type of hearsay presented.  
 These findings demonstrate that when evaluating hearsay evidence, jurors are attuned 
to factors that the law may not appreciate. This has substantial implications for legal policy 
and practice. These findings suggest a new dimension of competency with respect to how 
jurors evaluate evidence. They also suggest that the normative debate over hearsay  
evidence—that jurors do not think critically about it—should change. Finally, the findings 
present a cautionary tale to trial practitioners who make ground-level decisions about  
hearsay evidence. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
 The production of weak evidence when strong is available can lead 
only to the conclusion that the strong would have been adverse. Si-
lence then becomes evidence of the most convincing character. 
– Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States1
 The American legal system allows attorneys substantial freedom 
to present their cases in the manner they deem most persuasive and 
effective. The practicing attorney has several tools in her arsenal: 
She may vary the type of evidence she presents, the mode through 
which that evidence is presented, or even the types of witnesses she 
calls. She may present either direct evidence, such as an eyewitness, 
or circumstantial evidence, such as the results from forensic analysis. 
She may choose to call live witnesses to testify, or she may opt to en-
ter into evidence writings or recordings. She may also call a mixture 
of witnesses, including those who will testify only to their knowledge 
of the facts of the case and others who will proffer expert testimony. 
 These strategic decisions are not without potential costs. For 
many reasons, a party may decide to proffer weaker evidence instead 
of evidence a factfinder may consider the “best” evidence of some trial 
fact. For example, an attorney who is concerned that an eyewitness is 
unlikely to be persuasive may, under certain circumstances, produce 
                                                                                                                  
 1. 306 U.S. 208, 226 (1939) (citation omitted). 
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documentary evidence instead.2 By doing so, the attorney can convey 
the same information to the factfinder without submitting the  
eyewitness to potentially damaging cross-examination. But if the 
factfinder would expect the witness to testify, might the attorney’s 
failure to call the witness—even though the decision to do so is per-
mitted under the Federal Rules of Evidence—affect the factfinder’s 
judgment of the persuasiveness of the attorney’s case? Might a jury 
look beyond the evidence presented to it and attempt to discern an 
attorney’s motivation for producing—or failing to produce—certain 
witnesses? If so, does a jury’s ability to “see through” an attorney’s 
trial strategy affect its verdicts in systematic ways?  
 Consider domestic violence trials. Commentators have noted that 
prosecuting these cases can be difficult because an initially coopera-
tive witness—typically the allegedly battered spouse—may later be-
come uncooperative and refuse to testify against the alleged batter-
er.3 The prosecuting attorney is then put in a quandary: should she 
instead proffer the alleged victim’s 911 telephone call, or should she 
dismiss the charges against the defendant? Legal commentators have 
expressed concern that the prosecutor’s failure to produce the alleged 
victim in court may seriously impede the prosecutor’s ability to convict 
the defendant.4 These concerns may be fueled, in part, by the motiva-
tional inferences commentators believe that jurors will make regard-
ing the victim’s failure to testify. This suggests that the motivation 
underlying a party’s trial strategy might be an important, largely  
unstudied variable in determining how jurors reach legal decisions. 
 Motivation is a driving force behind human behavior, from our 
desire to eat, to our desire for safety, to our desire to love and to 
achieve.5 It can be either intrinsic or extrinsic,6 and the result of ei-
ther conscious desires or subconscious preferences.7 It can even shape 
the ways in which we perceive the world around us and the ways in 
which we make decisions. For example, the psychological literature 
                                                                                                                  
 2. See generally FED. R. EVID. art. VIII, X (allowing certain records to be admitted 
into evidence as an exception to the general rule against hearsay and prescribing specific 
rules for the admissibility of writings, recordings, and photographs). Practitioners should 
consult their specific state’s law on this issue as well. 
 3. See, e.g., Neal A. Hudders, The Problem of Using Hearsay in Domestic Violence 
Cases: Is a New Exception the Answer?, 49 DUKE L.J. 1041, 1041-42, 1044 (2000); Robert P. 
Mosteller, Crawford’s Impact on Hearsay Statements in Domestic Violence and Child Sexu-
al Abuse Cases, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 411, 415 (2005). 
 4. Hudders, supra note 3, at 1047, 1051. 
 5. See A.H. Maslow, A Theory of Human Motivation, 50 PSYCHOL. REV. 370, 394 
(1943); see also Richard M. Ryan & Edward L. Deci, Self-Determination Theory and the 
Facilitation of Intrinsic Motivation, Social Development, and Well-Being, 55 AM. PSY-
CHOLOGIST 68, 68 (2000) (stating that self-motivation is based on “people’s inherent growth 
tendencies and innate psychological needs”). 
 6. See Edward L. Deci, Effects of Externally Mediated Rewards on Intrinsic Motiva-
tion, 18 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 105, 105 (1971).
 7. See Maslow, supra note 5, at 386-88. 
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on motivated reasoning has demonstrated that people are sometimes 
so motivated to achieve some outcome, or so motivated to preserve 
some aspect of their world view, that instead of searching rationally 
for information that either confirms or disconfirms a particular  
belief, they seek out solely information that confirms what they  
already believe.8
 Recent empirical findings reveal a dark side to our perceptions of 
others’ motives. In Western cultures, psychologists have identified a 
“norm of self-interest,” in which people believe that “self-interest both 
is and ought to be a powerful determinant of behavior.”9 People there-
fore tend to act (or appear to act) in their self-interest because it is 
normatively expected that they do so, and they tend to believe that 
opinions or actions that do not have clear self-interest motivations 
“will be regarded as unnatural and deviant” by others.10 Recent em-
pirical data supports this proposition. People tend to imagine self-
interested motives for others’ generosity and altruistic behavior,11
and people whose self-interested motives are not obvious are viewed 
suspiciously12 and penalized socially.13 In sum, people tend to be cyni-
cal of the motives for others’ actions. 
 People also make motivational inferences regarding the inac-
tions—or omissions—of others. Recent research suggests that, be-
cause communicators are motivated by strategic self-presentation, 
they often will underreport negative information in describing their 
perceptions of others.14 For example, when describing a job applicant 
to a colleague, the communicator might describe the candidate’s de-
meanor (by mentioning that the candidate is “nice”) and omit infor-
mation relevant to the applicant’s competency for the job. Important-
ly, listeners are attuned to communicators’ self-presentation motiva-
tion and will infer—by the colleague’s silence—that the candidate is 
                                                                                                                  
 8. See Erica Dawson, Thomas Gilovich & Dennis T. Regan, Motivated Reasoning and 
Performance on the Wason Selection Task, 28 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1379, 
1379-80 (2002); Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480, 
482-83 (1990). This is sometimes referred to as the confirmation bias. See, e.g., P.C. Wason, 
On the Failure to Eliminate Hypotheses in a Conceptual Task, 12 Q. J. EXPERIMENTAL PSY-
CHOL. 129 (1960); see also Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phe-
nomenon in Many Guises, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175, 175-78 (1998).  
 9. Dale T. Miller, The Norm of Self-Interest, 54 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1053, 1053 (1999).  
 10. Dale T. Miller, The Norm of Self-Interest 9 (CEPR Conference on Psychol. & Econ. 
June 8, 2011), available at http://www.cepr.org/meets/wkcn/3/3509/papers/miller. 
 11. See Clayton R. Critcher & David Dunning, No Good Deed Goes Unquestioned: 
Cynical Reconstruals Maintain Belief in the Power of Self-Interest, 47 J. EXPERIMENTAL 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 1207 (2011). 
 12. Rebecca K. Ratner & Dale T. Miller, The Norm of Self-Interest and Its Effects on 
Social Action, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5, 14-15 (2001). 
 13. Nadia Chernyak & David Pizarro, The Case for “Too Much” Altruism: Perceptions 
of and Reactions Towards Altruistic Behaviors (2012) (unpublished manuscript in prepara-
tion) (on file with author). 
 14. Hilary B. Bergsieker et al., Stereotyping by Omission: Eliminate the Negative, 
Accentuate the Positive, 102 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1214, 1214 (2012). 
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not qualified for the job.15 Thus, people appear quite skilled at recog-
nizing the motivations of others and drawing appropriate inferences 
from those motivations. 
 In light of this psychological research, it is no surprise that moti-
vation may manifest itself implicitly in numerous aspects of the law. 
A legal actor’s motivation and credibility are entangled in various 
ways and inform jurors’ legal judgments, including their judgments 
of a defendant’s truthfulness16 and the persuasiveness of expert tes-
timony.17 Moreover, it is possible that the impact of motivation on a 
party’s credibility may extend to a party’s trial strategy itself. 
 Additional empirical tests of (1) our armchair theories about the 
role of motivation in the law and (2) how jurors respond to attorneys’ 
trial strategies are necessary. Specifically, how jurors perceive a par-
ty’s motive to proffer weaker evidence at trial is an empirically un-
studied topic. An illustrative area that has escaped empirical atten-
tion in this regard is a party’s decision to proffer hearsay evidence in 
court. To the extent that hearsay is weaker evidence—inasmuch as 
the original speaker cannot be cross-examined in court—do jurors 
care about why they receive it?  
 It is not obvious that jurors would take into account a party’s mo-
tivation when evaluating the probative value of hearsay, or that poli-
cymakers expect jurors to do so. Nonetheless, the experiments re-
ported in this Article suggest that jurors do exactly that. Moreover, 
they do so regardless of the legal actor who proffers the hearsay, re-
gardless of the type of case in which the hearsay is presented, and 
regardless of the type of hearsay proffered. These results are the first 
to suggest that a party’s motivation—actual or perceived—for proffer-
ing weaker evidence like hearsay plays a crucial role in jurors’ de-
terminations of the credibility of that evidence.  
 Several implications follow from the findings reported in this Arti-
cle. The findings suggest that jurors sometimes look beyond the evi-
dence when evaluating its probative weight. They also suggest to pol-
icymakers that one of the rationales for the ban on hearsay evi-
                                                                                                                  
 15. See Adam Harris et al., “Damned by Faint Praise”: A Bayesian Account, 31 PROC.
ANN. CONF. COGNITIVE SCI. SOC’Y 292 (2009) (examining innuendo effects in social  
interaction); Nicolas Kervyn et al., The Innuendo Effect: Hearing the Positive But Inferring 
the Negative, 48 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 77 (2012); Juan M. Madera et al.,  
Gender and Letters of Recommendation for Academia: Agentic and Communal Differences,
94 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 1591 (2009) (examining the application of innuendo effects in 
 professional settings). 
 16. See Clyde Hendrick & David R. Shaffer, Effect of Pleading the Fifth Amendment on 
Perceptions of Guilt and Morality, 6 BULL. PSYCHONOMIC SOC’Y 449, 449-52 (1975). For a more 
robust discussion of this experimental study, see infra notes 90-93 and accompanying text. 
 17. See Joel Cooper & Isaac M. Neuhaus, The “Hired Gun” Effect: Assessing the Effect 
of Pay, Frequency of Testifying, and Credentials on the Perception of Expert Testimony, 24 
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 149 (2000). For a more detailed description of this experimental 
study, see infra note 87-89 and accompanying text. 
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dence—that jurors fail to critically evaluate it—may not be accurate. 
The results also provide critical new information regarding how ad-
vocates can best present their cases to triers of fact. Attorneys ig-
nore—at considerable cost—the inferences that flow from their stra-
tegic choices to present evidence. 
II. LEGAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL BACKGROUND
 Courts routinely state that they assume jurors evaluate only the 
evidence presented to them and follow legal instructions issued by 
the trial judge.18 Behavioral research, however, suggests that these 
assumptions are often wrong.19 Jurors are subject to a slew of cogni-
tive biases and are not always attuned to information that legal poli-
cymakers expect.20 This occurs with respect to many aspects of trials, 
including determinations of liability or guilt,21 punitive damages 
awards,22 and capital sentencing.23
                                                                                                                  
 18. See, e.g., Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206-07 (1987); see also State v. Walk-
er, 356 S.E.2d 344, 346 (N.C. 1987) (“The law assumes that jurors will follow their instruc-
tions and act in a rational fashion.”); Stephen E. Fienberg & Mark J. Schervish, The Rele-
vance of Bayesian Inference for the Presentation of Statistical Evidence and for Legal Deci-
sionmaking, 66 B.U. L. REV. 771, 775 n.20 (1986) (“[T]he law assumes that a factfinder 
should be rational.”). 
 19. See, e.g., CHRISTINE L. RUVA, HOW PRETRIAL PUBLICITY AFFECTS JURORS DECI-
SION MAKING AND MEMORY (2010) (explaining how pretrial publicity affects views of the 
evidence); Harold Sigall & Nancy Ostrove, Beautiful but Dangerous: Effects of Offender 
Attractiveness and Nature of the Crime on Juridic Judgment, 31 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 410 (1975) (explaining that characteristics of the defendant herself, like physical 
attractiveness, affect jurors’ verdicts and sentencing decisions); see also J. Kevin Barge, 
David W. Schlueter & Alex Pritchard, The Effects of Nonverbal Communication and Gen-
der on Impression Formation in Opening Statements, 54 S. COMM. J. 330, 331-32 (1989) 
(explaining that an attorney’s nonverbal cues, including pauses and stuttering, affect ju-
rors’ views of the evidence against his client); Bonnie Erickson et al., Speech Style and 
Impression Formation in a Court Setting: The Effects of “Powerful” and “Powerless” Speech,
14 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 266 (1978) (explaining that speech style of defendant’s 
attorney affects views of evidence against the defendant). 
 20. See CASS SUNSTEIN ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: HOW JURIES DECIDE 211 (2002) 
(stating that some jury decisions reflect “systematic biases, some due to fundamental prop-
erties of the human mind, others due to culturally based, learned habits” and that “there 
are aspects of human behavior that seem to be erratic and unpredictable in terms of com-
monsense intuitions and behavioral science principles”); see also Ivan E. Bodensteiner, The
Implications of Psychological Research Related to Unconscious Discrimination and Implicit 
Bias in Proving Intentional Discrimination, 73 MO. L. REV. 83, 99-107 (2008) (discussing 
cognitive and unconscious biases that affect a decisionmaker’s judgment before even mak-
ing a decision); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias 
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 
(1995) (arguing that people’s unconscious forms of bias undermine the assumptions reflect-
ed in Title VII’s disparate treatment jurisprudence).
 21. See Ronald C. Dillehay & Marla R. Sandys, Life Under Wainwright v. Witt: Juror 
Dispositions and Death Qualification, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 147, 160 (1996) (finding that 
28.2% of “death qualified” jurors are so biased against defendants that they would vote 
automatically to sentence a guilty defendant to death, in violation of the law); D. Lynn 
Hazelwood & John C. Brigham, The Effects of Juror Anonymity on Jury Verdicts, 22 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 695, 710 (1998) (finding that anonymous jurors are subject to the psychologi-
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 These research findings have implications for a variety of areas 
under the law. For example, the law of evidence is premised largely 
on codified but empirically untested folk wisdom regarding how legal 
actors, like jurors, behave.24 Article VIII of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, which governs the use of hearsay evidence in federal trials, is 
an apropos example of this phenomenon, given its armchair assess-
ments of when hearsay actors are likely to be truthful and when they 
are not.25 Surprisingly, researchers only recently have examined how 
jurors process hearsay evidence, and the research so far is limited. 
 Hearsay is an intriguing area to study empirically, because the 
decision to proffer hearsay is strategic, inasmuch as it often arises 
under circumstances where a hearsay declarant has died, has moved 
away, or has become uncooperative. Yet policymakers apparently as-
sume that jurors do not consider this “extralegal” information when 
assigning probative weight to hearsay evidence. The studies reported 
in this Article suggest that, with respect to hearsay evidence, jurors 
do not behave as policymakers believe they do. Instead, jurors’ per-
ceptions of the probative value of hearsay include an evaluation of a 
party’s motive for proffering the hearsay evidence. Moreover, they 
discount the hearsay evidence in the absence of a benign explanation 
for receiving it. 
 To situate the experiments reported in this Article in their proper 
context, I will briefly discuss (1) the law of hearsay and recent psy-
chological research regarding how jurors process hearsay evidence and 
(2) what courts and psychologists have said regarding the propriety 
and ability of jurors to make motivational inferences more generally. 
                                                                                                                  
cal concept of deindividuation and may be more prone to convict a defendant when the 
evidence against him is strong). 
 22. See SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 20; Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Punitive Dam-
ages: How Judges and Juries Perform, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2004) (finding that juries differ 
from judges in awarding punitive damages).
 23. See Shari Seidman Diamond & Judith N. Levi, Improving Decisions on Death by 
Revising and Testing Jury Instructions, 79 JUDICATURE 224, 232 (1996) (arguing that ju-
rors misunderstand capital sentencing instructions and, as a result, “tend to fall back on 
their own prior knowledge”); James Luginbuhl & Julie Howe, Discretion in Capital Sen-
tencing Instructions: Guided or Misguided?, 70 IND. L.J. 1161, 1169 (1995) (suggesting that 
“juror beliefs and expectations about the legal system may lead them to erroneous inter-
pretations about legally relevant concepts” contained in capital sentencing instructions). 
 24. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The New Wigmore: An Essay on Rethinking the 
Foundation of Evidentiary Privileges, 83 B.U. L. REV. 315, 317 (2003) (stating that the fun-
damental justification for recognizing evidentiary privileges is the “behavioral assumption 
. . . that the typical layperson . . . would neither consult with nor divulge to a confidant . . . 
but for the assurance of confidentiality furnished by a formal evidentiary privilege). For a 
more robust discussion of this proposition, see infra notes 42-43 and accompanying text. 
 25. See FED R. EVID. 803; Gordon Van Kessel, Hearsay Hazards in the Modern  
American Criminal Trial: An Adversary-Oriented Approach, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 477, 485-87, 
499 (1998). 
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A.   Hearsay at 35,000 Feet 
1. The Hearsay Doctrine 
 The rule forbidding hearsay evidence at trial has been called the 
“spoiled child” of the common law evidence rules.26 It has no doubt 
earned this reputation because of the scholarly attention paid to its 
myriad intricacies and its slew of complex exceptions. Although par-
ties to litigation have used hearsay evidence in legal proceedings for 
almost 500 years,27 empirical scholarship on the effects that hearsay 
evidence has on trial outcomes is both recent and sparse. This is  
particularly odd because a prominent justification for the hearsay 
bar—that jurors are incompetent to properly evaluate hearsay evi-
dence—is an empirically testable question.  
 The rule against hearsay is, at its core, a rule against using se-
cond-hand information in court. Hearsay is formally defined as an 
out-of-court statement (made by a declarant) used in court (through, 
for example, the testimony of a hearsay witness) to prove that the 
substance of the out-of-court statement is true.28
 Hearsay often contains relevant information that a jury may find 
useful in making legal judgments. Nonetheless, courts generally pur-
port to bar hearsay evidence.29 Policymakers and legal commentators 
have offered an array of explanations for the bar against hearsay. 
Initially, legal scholars objected to hearsay because the hearsay de-
clarant is not subject to an oath to tell the truth, as compared to a 
witness who testifies in court.30 Other commentators have expressed 
concern that hearsay “removes us” from the facts of the case31 and, in 
                                                                                                                  
 26. JOHN H. WIGMORE, A STUDENTS’ TEXTBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 238 (1935); 
see also Stephan Landsman & Richard F. Rakos, Research Essay: A Preliminary Empirical 
Enquiry Concerning the Prohibition of Hearsay Evidence in American Courts, 15 LAW &
PSYCHOL. REV. 65, 65 (1991). 
 27. See Landsman & Rakos, supra note 26 at 67. 
 28. FED. R. EVID. 801(c) (“ ‘Hearsay’ means a statement that: (1) the declarant does 
not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing; and (2) a party offers in evidence 
to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.”). For example, if I testify in 
court to a belief that aliens are real and I say, “My neighbor told me that she saw a space-
ship land on her driveway,” the statement is inadmissible hearsay, because I am recount-
ing the out-of-court story in an effort to demonstrate that aliens exist. However, if I testify 
to my neighbor’s out-of-court statement in an effort to demonstrate that my neighbor is 
mentally ill, the statement is not hearsay and is potentially admissible, because I am not 
recounting the conversation to demonstrate that aliens exist. This is but one example of 
the intricacies and nuances that surround the hearsay doctrine. 
 29. See FED. R. EVID. 802 (“Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these 
rules or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority or 
by Act of Congress.”).  
 30. See GEOFFREY GILBERT, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (Garland Publ’g, Inc. 1979) (1754); 
Landsman & Rakos, supra note 26, at 68-69. 
 31. See Mortimer R. Kadish & Michael Davis, Defending the Hearsay Rule, 8 LAW &
PHIL. 333, 348-49 (1989) (“Taking the direct testimony of those who have seen or heard a 
disputed fact places the trier of fact as close to that fact as the nature of adjudication al-
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criminal trials, deprives the defendant of his right under the Sixth 
Amendment’s Confrontation Clause to confront witnesses.32 These 
issues, in turn, may lead to a “trial by ambush.”33   
 Other scholars have worried about the effects of hearsay on the 
legal system itself. Some commentators have argued that reliance on 
hearsay evidence can discredit the public’s perception of courts as 
impartial adjudicators of disputes.34 Other commentators have ar-
gued that judges would have too much discretion in deciding which 
hearsay statements they would allow into evidence.35 Professor 
Charles Nesson opined that trial outcomes might lack finality be-
cause hearsay declarants may later dispute the accuracy of hearsay 
statements attributed to them during trial.36
 Perhaps the most enduring rationale for barring hearsay evidence 
is the theory that jurors are incompetent to evaluate its probative 
strengths and weaknesses. This rationale harkens back to 19th cen-
tury English courts where Lord Mansfield expressed concern that “no 
man can tell what effect [hearsay] might have upon [lay jurors’] 
minds.”37 These courts worried that, because the hearsay declarant 
cannot be cross-examined, jurors will fail to appreciate the potential 
untrustworthiness of the evidence.38
 To be sure, hearsay evidence is rife with potential untrustworthi-
ness. The trustworthiness of hearsay depends on several factors at 
two different levels: that of the declarant and that of the hearsay 
                                                                                                                  
lows. Hearsay, on the other hand, puts the trier of fact at least one remove in a role resem-
bling that of a court of appeals.”). 
 32. The Supreme Court has recently breathed new life into the Sixth Amendment’s 
Confrontation Clause in a series of cases examining the hearsay doctrine. In these deci-
sions, the Court has ruled that a criminal defendant has an absolute constitutional right 
under the Sixth Amendment to cross-examine her accuser if the accuser makes an out-of-
court, testimonial statement against the defendant. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 
36, 68-69 (2004). Although the Confrontation Clause is not directly relevant to the non-
testimonial hearsay at issue in this Article, Part VI, infra, contains a discussion of the 
Confrontation Clause. 
 33. William C. Thompson & Maithilee K. Pathak, Empirical Study of Hearsay Rules: 
Bridging the Gap Between Psychology and Law, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 456, 460 (1999). 
 34. See Eleanor Swift, Abolishing the Hearsay Rule, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 495, 495 (1987) 
(“Reliance on . . . hearsay declarants threatens important values related to the rationality 
and fairness of trial adjudication.”). 
 35. See, e.g., Roger Park, The Hearsay Rule and the Stability of Verdicts: A Response 
to Professor Nesson, 70 MINN. L. REV. 1057, 1060 (1986). 
 36. Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Acceptabil-
ity of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357, 1373 (1985). 
 37. William Fitzharding Berkeley, (1811) 171 Eng. Rep. 128 (H.L.) [135] (appeal taken 
from Eng.); see Landsman & Rakos, supra note 26, at 66. 
 38. Regina A. Schuller, Expert Evidence and Hearsay: The Influence of “Secondhand” 
Information on Jurors’ Decisions, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 345, 346 (1995). These English 
jurists might have had in mind the infamous and oft-cited trials of Nicholas Throckmorton 
and Sir Walter Raleigh, which consisted largely of untrustworthy hearsay evidence. See 
Landsman & Rakos, supra note 26, at 67-68. Although a jury spared Throckmorton, a jury 
convicted Raleigh. He was eventually executed. Id.
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witness. The declarant must have accurately perceived the event at 
issue, accurately understood it, accurately remembered its details, 
and accurately conveyed those details to the hearsay witness. The 
hearsay witness, in turn, must have accurately perceived the declar-
ant’s statement, accurately remembered it, and must accurately con-
vey it to the factfinder. Any mistake during this process—through 
misinterpretation, forgetfulness, bias, or deception—reduces the 
trustworthiness of the hearsay statement.39
 Given the dangers surrounding the reliability of hearsay state-
ments, one might expect that courts have banned hearsay evidence in 
its entirety. But, in fact, they have not. For practical reasons, courts 
and policymakers have excluded from the hearsay bar certain kinds 
of statements—including admissions by party opponents and certain 
prior statements made by trial witnesses—that nonetheless meet the 
conceptual definition of hearsay.40 Moreover, the Federal Rules of Ev-
idence contain twenty-eight explicit exceptions to the rule barring 
hearsay, ranging from statements made while an individual is dying, 
to statements blurted out because of the excitement of some event, to 
statements made while seeking medical treatment.41 Many of these 
exceptions were created, at least in part, because policymakers be-
lieve these types of statements are highly reliable.42 For example, ac-
cording to policymakers, a dying individual would not want to meet 
his maker with a lie on his lips, an excited individual would not have 
time to fabricate her statement, and people are disincentivized to lie 
to their doctors when seeking treatment for medical ailments.43 In-
terestingly, these rationales rely on largely untested empirical 
hunches about how people behave. 
                                                                                                                  
 39. See Thompson & Pathak, supra note 33, at 464. See also Laurence H. Tribe, Tri-
angulating Hearsay, 87 HARV. L. REV. 957 (1974) (discussing these mistakes); Edmund M. 
Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 HARV. L. REV.
177 (1948) (same). 
 40. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d). 
 41. See FED. R. EVID. 803, 804, 807. 
 42. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee’s note (stating, while providing no 
empirical evidence in support, that “[t]he present rule proceeds upon the theory that under 
appropriate circumstances a hearsay statement may possess circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness sufficient to justify nonproduction of the declarant in person at the trial 
even though he may be available”).  
 43. Id. (explaining the rationale for the excited utterance exception to the hearsay 
doctrine as “simply that circumstances may produce a condition of excitement which tem-
porarily stills the capacity of reflection and produces utterances free of conscious fabrica-
tion,” and allowing an exception to the hearsay bar for statements made during the treat-
ment of medical ailments “in view of the patient’s strong motivation to be truthful”); see 
also FED. R. EVID. 804 advisory committee’s note (justifying the rationale for the dying 
declaration exception to the hearsay bar on the basis that, “[w]hile the original religious 
justification for the exception may have lost its conviction for some persons over the years, 
it can scarcely be doubted that powerful psychological pressures are present” for a dying 
individual to make truthful statements). 
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 This patchwork of behavioral intuition has led psychologists to 
question the assumptions underlying the hearsay doctrine and its 
exceptions. These psychologists posited that human beings confront 
hearsay frequently in their daily lives, are able to distinguish high-
quality hearsay from poor-quality hearsay, and can discount poor-
quality hearsay accordingly.44 In other words, these psychologists ar-
gued that jurors are sensitive to factors that can affect the reliability 
of hearsay statements. 
2. Empirical Hearsay Scholarship 
 The empirical study of hearsay began in the early 1990s. The 
scope of the research is limited, but the research has yielded broad 
lessons about how jurors process hearsay evidence.  
 The initial experiments examined how jurors process hearsay 
generally. Do jurors give hearsay its appropriate weight or do they 
under- or over-value it? Landsman and Rakos conducted the first 
such experiment, in which they varied the strength of various hear-
say statements in a mock trial.45 They found that, even though mock 
jurors reported that stronger hearsay statements were more im-
portant pieces of evidence than were weaker hearsay statements, 
none of those statements ultimately affected jurors’ guilt judgments.46
 Meine, Park, and Borgida reported similar results the next year 
when they compared the effects of hearsay evidence with the effects 
of eyewitness evidence on juror verdicts.47 Although the presence of 
an eyewitness nearly doubled the conviction rate (compared to cir-
cumstantial evidence alone), hearsay evidence raised the conviction 
rate just 4%.48 Moreover, participants self-reported that they did not 
consider the hearsay at all, which suggests that jurors may actually 
undervalue hearsay evidence.49
                                                                                                                  
 44. See infra Parts II.A.2, II.B. 
 45. Landsman & Rakos, supra note 26, at 73-74. Researchers manipulated the 
strength of the statements by varying the degree of the hearsay witness’s confidence and 
the degree to which the declarant was able to observe the crime. Id.
 46. Id. at 76.  
 47. See Peter Meine, Roger C. Park & Eugene Borgida, Juror Decision Making and 
the Evaluation of Hearsay Evidence, 76 MINN. L. REV. 683 (1992).
 48. Id. at 691-92, 699. This 4% difference was not statistically significant.
 49. Id. at 695. Jurors’ preference for evidence directly from the declarant also has 
been found in studies examining so-called “child hearsay.” In those studies, mock jurors 
were more likely to convict a defendant when the child testified directly, as compared to 
hearsay given by the child’s mother. See David F. Ross, R.C.L. Lindsay & Dorothy F. Mar-
sil, The Impact of Hearsay Testimony on Conviction Rates in Trials of Child Sexual Abuse: 
Toward Balancing the Rights of Defendants and Child Witnesses, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y &
L. 439, 446-47 (1999). They also rated the child’s testimony as more candid and honest 
when it came directly from the child in court. Id. at 447-48; see also Jonathan M. Golding, 
Mary C. Alexander & Terri L. Stewart, The Effect of Hearsay Witness Age in a Child Sexual 
Assault Trial, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 420, 427 (1999) (reporting a marginally signifi-
cant difference (p = .09) in convictions when the child testified directly compared to testi-
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 A third experiment studied whether jurors are sensitive to the dif-
ferences in the probative value of various hearsay statements and 
eyewitness identifications.50 Jurors were not sensitive to differences 
in the probative value of eyewitness identifications, but they were
sensitive to differences in the probative value of hearsay state-
ments.51 Altogether, these initial experiments suggest that jurors are 
not passive, unquestioning perceivers of hearsay. 
 These experiments leave an important question unanswered: 
What factors, in particular, do jurors focus on when they evaluate 
hearsay evidence? A handful of additional studies provide some an-
swers to this question, but also complicate the empirical narrative 
substantially. For example, some researchers found that jurors are 
attuned to factors such as the suggestive questioning of child declar-
ants52 and the effects of age on memory for hearsay statements in el-
der abuse cases.53
 But follow-up experiments have revealed that jurors are blind to 
other factors that affect the accuracy of hearsay. For example, Gold-
ing, Alexander, and Stewart found that, in the context of “child hear-
say,” jurors are not always attuned to the potential effects of the 
hearsay witness’s age on the reliability of hearsay statements.54 Oth-
er researchers have demonstrated that although hearsay witnesses 
often recall the “gist” of the declarant’s statement, they often fail to 
                                                                                                                  
mony from a hearsay witness); Gail S. Goodman et al., Hearsay Versus Children’s Testimo-
ny: Effects of Truthful and Deceptive Statements on Jurors’ Decisions, 30 LAW & HUM. BE-
HAV. 363, 389 (2006) (finding that “exposure to live child testimony was significantly asso-
ciated with jurors’ perception of greater child credibility and empathy toward the child” 
and “indirectly influenced jurors’ confidence of defendant guilt”); Allison D. Redlich et al., A
Comparison of Two Forms of Hearsay in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 7 CHILD MALTREAT-
MENT 312, 324 (2002) (finding that, before deliberation, “jurors who were presented with [a 
child declarant’s videotaped testimony] were more likely to believe the child disclosed fully 
during the pretrial forensic interview, which in turn increased child believability ratings 
and then consequently also increased ratings of defendant guilt.”). 
 50. Margaret Bull Kovera, Roger C. Park & Steven D. Penrod, Jurors’ Perceptions of 
Eyewitness and Hearsay Evidence, 76 MINN. L. REV. 703, 707, 719 (1992). The researchers 
put graduate students in the position of eyewitnesses to a potential crime and then re-
quired them to recall what they had seen after either a short or lengthy delay. This created 
objectively “good” and “poor” eyewitnesses. The researchers, in turn, had these eyewitness-
es report to hearsay witnesses what they had observed. The hearsay witnesses then re-
called what they heard after either a short or lengthy delay. This created objectively “good” 
and “poor” hearsay witnesses. Mock jurors then observed these eyewitnesses and hearsay 
witnesses and rated how persuasive they were. Id. at 707-10. 
 51. See id. at 719-20.  
 52. See Maithilee K. Pathak & William C. Thompson, From Child to Witness to Jury: 
Effects of Suggestion on the Transmission and Evaluation of Hearsay, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL’Y & L. 372, 374, 377, 378 (1999). 
 53. See Emily E. Dunlap et al., Perceptions of Elder Physical Abuse in the Courtroom: 
The Influence of Hearsay Witness Testimony, 19 J. ELDER ABUSE & NEGLECT 19, 35-36 (2007). 
 54. See Golding et al., supra note 49 at 433-34. But see John E. B. Myers et al., Jurors’ 
Perceptions of Hearsay in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 388, 411-
12 (1999); Amye R. Warren et al., The Believability of Children and Their Interviewers’ 
Hearsay Testimony: When Less is More, 87 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 846, 852 (2002). 
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recall the specifics (or they recall them inaccurately),55 and the re-
sulting information loss can prevent jurors from making accurate de-
cisions about the quality of the hearsay statements.56
 Additional hearsay research adds to the complexity. In examining 
how jurors respond to judicial instructions regarding hearsay, one 
study found that jurors are capable of completely disregarding inad-
missible hearsay that has been “blurted out” in court,57 but another 
study suggests that under certain conditions, jurors cannot disregard 
this evidence.58 Moreover, jurors appear incapable of using hearsay 
for a limited purpose, for example, to determine a witness’s state of 
mind or an expert witness’s credibility,59 and strong judicial instruc-
tions to disregard hearsay can produce psychological reactance in ju-
rors—a backlash effect in which jurors defiantly and explicitly con-
sider the forbidden evidence.60
 In sum, there exists a small collection of diverse empirical findings 
that examines how triers of fact respond to hearsay evidence. The 
initial empirical narrative was straightforward: Because jurors have 
experience with hearsay in their everyday lives, they are skeptical 
and discerning when evaluating it in court. Further research on the 
specific variables on which jurors focus, however, significantly com-
plicates this narrative and suggests that how jurors perceive hearsay 
may be more context dependent than initially believed. Moreover, 
jurors’ evaluations of hearsay can interact with judicial instructions 
in surprising ways. 
 Although these studies provide significant insight into how jurors 
perceive hearsay, they raise as many questions as they answer. In 
                                                                                                                  
 55. See Amye R. Warren & Cara E. Woodall, The Reliability of Hearsay Testimony: 
How Well Do Interviewers Recall Their Interviews With Children?, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y
& L. 355, 369 (1999). This finding could have a dramatic impact on the admissibility of 
hearsay statements. For example, an interviewer might believe that, during the interview, 
a child spontaneously implicated her parent as an abuser—which can cause a court to ad-
mit the incriminating statement into evidence under the excited utterance exception—
when the interviewer herself may have suggestively elicited the “spontaneous” statement 
from the child. See David Dunning, On the Social Psychology of Hearsay Evidence, 5 PSY-
CHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 473, 477 (1999).
 56. See Julie A. Buck, Amye R. Warren & John C. Brigham, When Does Quality 
Count?: Perceptions of Hearsay Testimony About Child Sexual Abuse Interviews, 28 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 599, 619 (2004); Warren & Woodall, supra note 55, at 357. 
 57. See Kerri L. Pickel, Inducing Jurors to Disregard Inadmissible Evidence: A Legal 
Explanation Does Not Help, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 407, 422 (1995). 
 58. See Dae H. Lee, Daniel A. Krauss & Joel Lieberman, The Effects of Judicial Ad-
monitions on Hearsay Evidence, 28 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 589 (2005). 
 59. See Angela Paglia & Regina A. Schuller, Jurors’ Use of Hearsay Evidence: The 
Effects of Type and Timing of Instructions, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 501, 514 (1998); Schuller, 
supra note 38, at 349. 
 60. See Lee et al., supra note 58, at 590-91. There is currently no explanation in the 
literature that has harmonized these findings. 
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the late 1990s, several commentators called for further research,61
provided a framework for that future research,62 and identified specif-
ic areas into which current hearsay research could be extended.63 De-
spite a few trickles of additional research,64 empirical research on 
hearsay has largely receded. 
B.   Motivational Inferences and the Law 
 Until now, the vast majority of empirical hearsay research has 
focused, in whole or in part, on whether jurors are attuned to cogni-
tive factors that may influence the reliability of the hearsay state-
ment itself. These factors include the effects of time and age on a per-
son’s memory for a hearsay statement, and the ways in which sug-
gestive questioning can alter a child declarant’s schema and memory 
for an event. But what if jurors are attuned to other factors that 
might affect the quality of a hearsay statement but are not obviously 
linked to the properties of the hearsay itself? Past research has not 
addressed this question, and the answer may shed additional light on 
whether jurors are thinking critically about hearsay evidence specifi-
cally, and attorneys’ strategic decisions more generally. 
 An unexplored research area, first proposed by Dunning, is the 
role that a party’s motivation might play in jurors’ perceptions of 
hearsay evidence.65 Within the confines of evidentiary rules, practice 
rules, statutes, and state and federal constitutions, parties to litiga-
tion are free to present their case to a factfinder in any manner they 
choose. Parties therefore often have a choice regarding whether to 
proffer hearsay evidence, instead of the declarant’s in-court testimo-
ny, to a factfinder. No one has studied whether jurors are attuned to 
the motivation underlying a party’s strategic decision to proffer hear-
say and what effect, if any, that decision might have on how jurors 
respond to hearsay evidence. For example, imagine a scenario in 
which an attorney wishes to shield a hearsay declarant from cross-
examination by instead calling a hearsay witness to the stand at tri-
al. To the extent that jurors accurately deduce what the attorney has 
done, might jurors infer that there is some impeachable aspect of the 
underlying declarant’s testimony and discount the hearsay? Con-
versely, if an attorney proffers hearsay out of necessity—for example, 
because the declarant has died—will jurors take that into account 
                                                                                                                  
 61. See Lucy S. McGough, Hearing and Believing Hearsay, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y &
L. 485, 494 (1999). 
 62. See Thompson & Pathak, supra note 33, at 465. 
 63. See Dunning, supra note 55, at 477-79. 
 64. See, e.g., Buck et al., supra note 56; Dunlap et al., supra note 53; Goodman et al., 
supra note 49; Lee et al., supra note 58. 
 65. Dunning, supra note 55, at 481.  
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when evaluating the evidence and reduce the discount they might 
normally give the probative weight of the hearsay evidence? 
 There are many reasons to believe that jurors might be attuned to 
a party’s motivation to proffer hearsay. As Dunning notes, it is a 
shibboleth of social psychology that when evaluating the persuasive 
force of an actor’s argument, people are quite sensitive to factors, like 
bias, that might render the argument less credible and persuasive.66
Consider, for example, inadmissible facts that come to light through 
pretrial publicity, on which jurors often rely, even though they should 
not.67 If mock jurors are provided information that casts suspicion on 
the pretrial publicity—for example, that the person who introduced 
the pretrial publicity has a proverbial axe to grind—jurors discount 
the publicity when rendering their judgments.68
 To some degree, the law appears to recognize that jurors will focus 
on a trial actor’s motivation when making legal decisions. Consider, 
for example, the “absent witness” instruction available in many ju-
risdictions. The instruction states that where a party, without expla-
nation, fails to call a witness who is (1) known to the party, (2) friend-
ly to the party (or at least not hostile), and (3) available to give  
material, favorable, non-cumulative testimony, then the jury may 
infer that the witness would have given testimony unfavorable to 
that party.69 Thus, under certain circumstances, the law explicitly 
allows—and even encourages—jurors to consider when they make 
their legal judgments the motivation underlying a party’s decision 
not to call a witness. 
 Similarly, the law appears to recognize that sometimes jurors will 
focus inappropriately on a trial actor’s motivation and will instruct 
jurors to disregard any such inferences. For example, if a certain par-
                                                                                                                  
 66. See id. at 481. 
 67. See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Kramer, Norbert L. Kerr & John S. Carroll, Pretrial Publici-
ty, Judicial Remedies, and Jury Bias, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 409 (1990). 
 68. See Dunning, supra note 55, at 481; Steven Fein, Allison L. McCloskey & Thomas 
M. Tomlinson, Can the Jury Disregard That Information? The Use of Suspicion to Reduce 
the Prejudicial Effects of Pretrial Publicity and Inadmissible Testimony, 23 PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1215, 1220 (1997). 
 69. See, e.g., United States v. Harwood, 189 F. App’x 661, 663 (9th Cir. 2006); United 
States v. Drozdowski, 313 F.3d 819, 825 n.3 (3d Cir. 2002); United States v. Nahoom, 791 
F.2d 841, 846 (11th Cir. 1986); United States v. Anders, 602 F.2d 823, 825 (8th Cir. 1979); 
United States v. Mahone, 537 F.2d 922, 926 (7th Cir. 1976); see also Haliburton v. State, 
561 So. 2d. 248, 250 (Fla. 1990); Commonwealth v. Schatvet, 499 N.E.2d 1208, 1210-11 
(Mass. 1986); People v. Gonzalez, 502 N.E.2d 583, 585-86 (N.Y. 1986). A typical absent 
witness instruction reads as follows: “If it is peculiarly within the power of [Party A] to 
produce a witness who could give material testimony, or if the witness would be favorably 
disposed to the government, failure to call that witness may justify an inference that [his 
or her] testimony would be unfavorable to [Party A]. No such inference is justified if the 
witness is equally available or favorably disposed to both parties or if the testimony would mere-
ly repeat other evidence.” See, e.g., FIRST CIRCUIT CRIMINAL PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 2.12
(2003), available at http://www.mad.uscourts.gov/resources/pattern2003/html/patt6qer.htm. 
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ty should not naturally be expected to call a witness, and both parties 
have an equal opportunity to call that witness, the judge may in-
struct the jury that the witness’s absence “should not affect [their] 
judgment[s] in any way.”70 Underlying this jury instruction is a pre-
sumption that the jury may unfairly believe that one of the parties 
has purposely “hidden” the witness and may unfairly penalize that 
party when making their legal judgments. In theory, an equal oppor-
tunity instruction can neutralize these suspicions. 
 Federal courts, including the Supreme Court, have explicitly held 
that factfinders may consider a party’s strategy for proffering evi-
dence in deciding the probative weight to afford that evidence. In In-
terstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, the federal government sought 
an injunction against the defendant film distributors to prevent them 
from carrying out an alleged conspiracy to fix prices for movie licens-
es in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act.71 The defendants ap-
pealed to the United States Supreme Court the district court’s find-
ing that the defendants had engaged in a conspiracy. In affirming the 
district court’s decision, the Supreme Court noted that the district 
court’s decision was based, in part, on the fact that the defendants 
omitted “as witnesses any of the [senior officers of their companies] 
who [had] negotiated the contracts” (and “would have had knowledge 
of the existence or non-existence of [any collusion] among the distrib-
utors”).72 Instead, the defendants called as witnesses middle manag-
ers who had little knowledge of the transactions at issue.73 In affirm-
ing the district court, the Supreme Court held that “[t]he failure un-
der the circumstances to call as witnesses those [senior] officers . . . is 
itself persuasive that their testimony, if given, would have been un-
favorable” to the defendants.74 Moreover, “[t]he production of weak 
evidence when strong is available can lead only to the conclusion that 
the strong would have been adverse. Silence then becomes evidence 
of the most convincing character.”75
                                                                                                                  
 70. See 4 LEONARD SAND, MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL ¶ 75.01 (2007);
see also United States v. Caccia, 122 F.3d 136, 139 (2d Cir. 1997); United States v. Lewis, 
40 F.3d 1325, 1336 (1st Cir. 1994); United States v. Spinosa, 982 F.2d 620, 632 (1st Cir. 
1992); Brown v. United States, 414 F.2d 1165, 1166-68 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Fleming v. SafeCo 
Ins. Co. of America, 206 Cal. Rptr. 313, 319 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Jackson v. State, 575 
So. 2d 181, 187-88 (Fla. 1991); Commonwealth v. Bryer, 494 N.E.2d 1335, 1337-38 (Mass. 1986). 
 71. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 213 (1939). 
 72. Id. at 221.  
 73. Id. at 226. 
 74. Id.
 75. Id. (citation omitted). Other courts have followed suit. See e.g., UAW v. NLRB, 459 
F.2d 1329, 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (“The failure to bring before the tribunal some circum-
stance, document, or witness, when either the party himself or his opponent claims that 
the facts would thereby be elucidated, serves to indicate, as the most natural inference, 
that the party fears to do so, and this fear is some evidence that the circumstance or docu-
ment or witness, if brought, would have exposed facts unfavorable to the party.”); see also
United States v. Roberson, 233 F.2d 517, 519 (5th Cir. 1956) (“Unquestionably the failure 
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 Some federal courts have gone further. In United States v. Chris-
tians, for example, the Eighth Circuit affirmed a trial court ruling 
that allowed prosecutors to proffer evidence to clarify the reason that 
the government had not produced certain evidence in its case-in-
chief.76 The federal government had accused Christians of being a 
felon in possession of a firearm.77 The government had intended to 
use, as the centerpiece of its case, the defendant’s videotaped confes-
sion, which the government had allowed the unsupervised defendant 
to view.78 Just before trial, the government discovered that the vide-
otapes had been erased and sought to put forth evidence that the de-
fendant had erased the tapes.79 The defendant objected to the evi-
dence as more prejudicial than probative, but the district court ruled 
the evidence admissible. In affirming the trial court’s ruling, the 
Eighth Circuit noted that “the evidence was necessary to clarify the 
reason for the government’s failure to present the videotapes to the 
jury,” and that “the government itself was in danger of being unfairly 
prejudiced if it was not permitted to introduce the testimony about 
the videotapes being blank.”80 Without this evidence, held the court, 
“there was a substantial risk that the prosecution’s failure to produce 
the videotapes at trial would give rise to a jury inference that the 
government had something to hide.”81
 These cases raise the same question: Why might jurors be attuned 
to a party’s motivation when they make legal judgments? Psychology 
research indicates that the answer may lie in the ways in which ju-
rors arrive at their verdicts. Initially, many researchers believed that 
jurors reach legal decisions in a Bayesian way: each juror “calculates” 
a prior probability of the defendant’s guilt and, with each piece of 
new evidence, “recalculates” the probability of the defendant’s guilt 
continually throughout the trial.82 But in the late 1980s, Reid Hastie 
                                                                                                                  
of a defendant in a civil case to testify or offer other evidence within his ability to produce 
and which would explain or rebut a case made by the other side, may, in a proper case, be 
considered as a circumstance against him and may raise a presumption that the evidence 
would not be favorable to his position.”). 
 76. 200 F.3d 1124, 1126-27 (8th Cir. 1999). 
 77. Id. at 1125. 
 78. Id. at 1126-27. 
 79. Id.
 80. Id. at 1127. 
 81. Id. However, not all courts take this view. In a criminal trial involving forensic 
evidence, the government proffered testimony explaining that it would not be unusual to 
fail to find the defendant’s latent fingerprints on a handgun at issue. Characterizing the 
relevancy of the evidence as “obscure” in dicta, Judge Posner, writing for the Seventh Cir-
cuit, noted that “[s]ince no fingerprints were found, neither side was helped; and we can’t 
see what difference it makes whether failure to find fingerprints on a gun is common or 
uncommon.” United States v. Paladino, 401 F.3d 471, 478 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 82. For a discussion of this model and variations on it, see Kenworthey Bilz, We Don’t 
Want to Hear It: Psychology, Literature and the Narrative Model of Judging, 2010 U. ILL. L.
REV. 429 (2010). 
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and Nancy Pennington proposed a vastly different theory of legal de-
cisionmaking: jurors create alternative “trial narratives” and choose 
the narrative that best fits all of the evidence.83 Hastie and Penning-
ton termed this model, which has received considerable empirical 
support,84 the “story model” of jury decisionmaking.85 Perhaps it is 
unsurprising that in crafting these narratives, jurors are likely to 
look at the motivation of different trial actors when determining 
which trial narrative is the “correct” one in a given case. 
 We see evidence of jurors’ attentiveness to motivational factors in 
myriad legal contexts. For example, prosecutors routinely decide to 
include in their case-in-chief a motive on the part of the criminal de-
fendant for committing the crime. Interestingly, prosecutors do so 
even though most trials do not require the prosecutor to provide a 
motive. Of course, prosecutors will provide a motive often to demon-
strate that a defendant possessed the specific intent to commit the 
crime. But researchers recognize that underlying these prosecutorial 
decisions is an understanding that jurors, in creating a trial narra-
tive, will inevitably make inferences about the defendant’s motiva-
tion to commit the crime, and may question why the prosecutor has 
not established such a motive.86   
 We see further evidence of jurors’ attention to a trial actor’s moti-
vation with respect to expert witnesses. Cooper and Neuhaus found 
what they termed a “hired gun effect” among experts who are highly 
paid for their testimony.87 The researchers found that jurors rated 
experts who charged significantly higher hourly rates for their testi-
mony as less trustworthy and more annoying than experts who 
charged lower hourly rates for the same substantive testimony.88 This 
suggests that jurors make spontaneous negative inferences regarding 
the motivation of these experts to testify, and the study further  
suggests that these inferences affect not only jurors’ impressions of 
                                                                                                                  
 83. See Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Explaining the Evidence: Tests of the Story 
Model for Juror Decision Making, 62 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 189 (1992). 
 84. See, e.g., Reid Hastie, What’s the Story? Explanations and Narratives in Civil Jury 
Decisions, in CIVIL JURIES AND CIVIL JUSTICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES
23, 25-29 (Brian H. Bornstein et al. eds., 2008). 
 85. Pennington & Hastie, supra note 83, at 189-92. 
 86. See W. LANCE BENNETT & MARTHA S. FELDMAN, RECONSTRUCTING REALITY IN THE 
COURTROOM: JUSTICE AND JUDGMENT IN AMERICAN CULTURE 64-65 (1981); see also Nor-
man J. Finkel, Commonsense Justice, Culpability, and Punishment, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV.
669, 700 (2000) (stating that research on story models “tell[s] us that jurors typically begin 
[their analysis of the case] with the subjective motives and intentions of the actor . . . to find 
the motivational thread that weaves plot and story,” and “if we examine how prosecuting and 
defense attorneys tell their stories in opening and closing statements, we would probably 
find the subjective thread woven quite prominently throughout those stories as well.”). 
 87. Cooper & Neuhaus, supra note 17, at 158, 162. 
 88. Id. at 158 (reporting a main effect of an expert’s fee on these traits). 
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the experts, but also their judgments of the persuasive force of the  
experts’ testimony.89
 Jurors also make these inferences with respect to defendants who 
exercise their Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination dur-
ing trial. Although jurors are instructed that they cannot draw nega-
tive inferences from a defendant’s invocation of the Fifth Amend-
ment, an experiment by Hendrick and Shaffer suggested that jurors 
do so.90 Mock jurors who read a trial transcript in which the defend-
ant invoked his Fifth Amendment right were more likely to think the 
defendant committed the crime and rated the defendant as signifi-
cantly less moral than a defendant who testified and denied his in-
volvement in the crime.91 The authors suggested, among other phe-
nomena, that when the defendant invoked the Fifth Amendment, ju-
rors believed that the defendant was withholding information from 
them.92 Jurors then reacted to that withholding of information by im-
puting onto the defendant a motivation for doing so: that he was 
guilty and was “hiding” behind the Fifth Amendment.93
 Other studies provide support for the view that when jurors think 
that evidence has been withheld from them, they draw a negative 
inference regarding the withholding party’s motivation for doing so. 
In a mock criminal trial, Shaffer, Sadowski and Hendrick manipulat-
ed the obviousness with which the defendant was withholding from 
mock jurors information about a crime.94 Defendants who more obvi-
ously withheld information were deemed more likely to be guilty, less 
attractive, and less desirable than defendants who had not obviously  
withheld information.95
 In a follow-up study, Shaffer and Sadowski varied whether a de-
fendant’s decision to invoke the Fifth Amendment was attributable to 
the defendant alone or instead to an external source, such as the de-
fendant’s attorney.96 Again, the defendant’s decision to invoke the 
Fifth Amendment led jurors to draw negative inferences against the 
defendant.97 Interestingly, the guilt ratings for defendants who in-
                                                                                                                  
 89. The expert’s fee did not affect mock jurors’ verdicts by itself. The researchers ob-
served a statistically significant interaction between the expert’s fee and the expert’s cre-
dentials, such that highly paid, highly credentialed experts were much less likely to affect 
jurors’ verdicts than were other experts. Id. at 155. In sum, “[w]hat apparently affected the 
jury was a combination of pay and credentials.” Id. at 154. 
 90. Hendrick & Shaffer, supra note 16, at 451. 
 91. Id.
 92. Id. at 452. 
 93. Id. at 451. 
 94. See David R. Shaffer, Cyril Sadowski & Clyde Hendrick, Effects of Withheld  
Evidence on Juridic Decisions, 42 PSYCHOL. REP. 1235, 1236-38 (1978). 
 95. See id. at 1240. 
 96. See David R. Shaffer & Cyril Sadowski, Effects of Withheld Evidence on Juridic 
Decisions II: Locus of Withholding Strategy, 5 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 40,
41 (1979). 
 97. Id. at 42-43. 
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voked the Fifth Amendment of their own accord were marginally 
greater than the ratings for those who did so on the advice of their 
attorney.98 These findings suggest that (1) jurors draw negative infer-
ences when a defendant withholds information from them; and (2) if a 
defendant’s decision to withhold information is clearly attributable to 
an external source, jurors may adjust their inferences accordingly. 
C.   The Present Study 
 What are the implications of these research findings for how ju-
rors think about a party’s motivation to introduce hearsay evidence? 
To the extent a party decides to proffer hearsay, the party often omits 
the declarant’s in-court testimony. Past research suggests not only 
that jurors pay attention to the motivations underlying the actions of 
prosecutors, defendants, and expert witnesses, but also that these 
actors’ motivations become more salient to jurors in the absence of 
stronger evidence. Thus, with respect to a party’s decision to proffer 
hearsay evidence in lieu of a declarant’s in-court testimony, I hypoth-
esized the following:  
(1) Jurors will discount hearsay evidence compared to the 
declarant’s in-court testimony.  
(2) When weighing hearsay evidence, jurors will consider 
the party’s strategy for proffering it.  
(3) In the absence of a satisfactory explanation for receiving 
hearsay evidence, jurors will draw negative inferences 
from the hearsay, which will affect their legal judgments.  
(4) These effects will be magnified when the hearsay put 
forth is a particularly poor substitute for the declarant’s 
in-court testimony.  
The current study addresses these hypotheses. 
III.   MAIN EXPERIMENT: METHOD
A.   Participants 
 One hundred twenty jury-eligible volunteers99 from the communi-
ty surrounding a large Midwestern university participated in this 
study. Participants were recruited through several methods: (1) 
emailed announcements to participate in a study on jury deci-
sionmaking; (2) in-person solicitation in cafeterias and train stations 
surrounding campus; and (3) in-class announcements in various de-
                                                                                                                  
 98. Id. at 42.  
 99. M-age = 26.09, SD = 9.65. The age of participants ranged from eighteen to fifty 
years. Sixty-seven percent of the participants identified themselves as Caucasian, fifteen 
percent identified themselves as Asian, twelve percent identified themselves as African-
American, and six percent identified with other races and ethnicities. 
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partments around the university. Participants did not receive pay-
ment or, if they were students, course credit. Rather, all participants 
were entered into a raffle to receive an iPod Shuffle device.  
 Participants were randomly assigned to seven experimental condi-
tions and assumed the role of a mock juror in a criminal trial. After 
signing informed consent forms, these volunteers read a hypothetical 
trial vignette and responded to a series of questions. Participants 
were then debriefed and thanked. 
B.   Procedure 
 Participants read a brief vignette of a criminal trial in state court. 
The state accused the defendant of robbing a convenience store, 
shooting the clerk, and absconding with $300 in cash from the regis-
ter. The trial presented conflicting evidence regarding the defend-
ant’s guilt and contained evidence presented through a hearsay wit-
ness. Two variables were systematically manipulated: (1) the prose-
cutor’s motivation for putting forth the hearsay evidence; and (2) how 
well the hearsay evidence substituted for the declarant’s in-court tes-
timony (the “substitution quality” of the evidence). In a control condi-
tion, mock jurors heard the declarant’s in-court testimony instead of  
hearsay evidence. 
 In each condition, mock jurors learned that a man who claimed to 
have witnessed the robbery dialed 911 and gave the name and de-
scription of the man he claimed robbed the store.100 Officers arrested 
the suspect one block away with $400 in his coat pocket. In all exper-
imental conditions, the trial included testimony from the arresting 
officer, the defendant, and the 911 operator, who provided hearsay 
testimony on behalf of the alleged eyewitness declarant.  
 Depending on the experimental condition, mock jurors either (1) 
learned that the prosecutor was proffering hearsay out of necessity 
because the alleged eyewitness had died before trial (the “benign” 
strategy); or (2) learned that the prosecutor was proffering hearsay 
out of convenience because the prosecutor wished to shield the 911 
caller from cross-examination (the “suspicious” strategy).101 In the 
                                                                                                                  
 100. The factual scenario was designed to fit the “excited utterance” and “present sense 
impression” exceptions to the rule barring hearsay, and was designed so that the hearsay 
statements did not violate the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confront his accuser. 
Specifically, the 911 caller characterized the situation as an ongoing emergency with a 
gunman who was still at large. See Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1147-49 (2011); 
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 101. In an additional control condition, some participants received no explanation for 
the prosecutor’s use of hearsay. In this “no explanation” (or “unknown”) control condition, 
the vignette read only that “[t]he State’s case-in-chief was presented by the 911 operator.” 
To determine whether jurors prefer in-court testimony to hearsay evidence, the data col-
lected from these participants were compared to the data from the other control condition, 
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benign condition, the vignette read: “The State’s case-in-chief was 
presented by the 911 operator. The State did not call the 911 caller to 
the stand because he had died of an unrelated illness before trial.” In 
contrast, in the suspicious condition, the vignette read: “The State’s 
case-in-chief was presented by the 911 operator. The State could have 
had the 911 caller testify but chose not to because the State was not 
sure he would be an effective witness on cross-examination.”102
 Additionally, the substitution quality of the 911 operator’s testi-
mony was manipulated: either (1) she played an audiotape of her 
conversation with the alleged eyewitness (the “good” substitution, 
because it provided an accurate account of what the alleged eyewit-
ness had said); or (2) she testified as to the gist of that conversation 
(the “poor” substitution). For participants who received a good substi-
tution, the vignette read, “On the tape, the caller said that the robber 
was John Smith from the neighborhood—Caucasian, about 6’2”, ap-
proximately 220 pounds, with a birthmark on his face.” For partici-
pants who received a poor substitution, the vignette read: “According 
to the 911 operator, the caller named the defendant, whom he had 
apparently seen around the neighborhood; said he was White, a little 
over 6’ tall and around 220 pounds; and that he had some sort of 
mark on his face.” In both conditions, the 911 operator testified as to 
how long ago the call took place, how often she works, and how many 
calls she fields on average per shift. 
 The testimony of the arresting officer and the defendant did not 
vary by condition. This produced a 2x2 between-subjects design  
with two additional control conditions (which contained either an 
in-court, non-hearsay witness, or a hearsay witness who was called 
for unspecified reasons).103
 After reading the vignette, participants answered several ques-
tions relating to their impressions of the trial. Participants first rat-
ed, on a 7-point Likert scale,104 the likelihood that the defendant had 
                                                                                                                  
in which an in-court witness recounted the details of of the crime.  The results are dis-
cussed in Part IV.C., infra,
 102. Mock jurors were informed of the party’s motivation through a “God’s eye” view. It 
was important to first establish whether jurors consider information regarding a party’s 
trial strategy at all. Once that phenomenon is established, then more subtle manipulations 
of the party’s motive are appropriate. A subtler manipulation of a party’s strategy to prof-
fer hearsay was undertaken in Follow-up Study 1. See infra Part V.A.1. 
 103. A 2x2 design means that one experimental variable—here, the prosecutor’s trial 
strategy—contains two different versions (benign and suspicious,) while the other—the 
substitution quality of the evidence—also contains two different versions (good and poor). A 
between-subjects design means that different participants read different versions of the  
trial vignette. 
 104. A Likert scale is a psychometric scale commonly used in questionnaires to capture 
data from ordinal variables (from 1 to 7). See ROBERT M. LAWLESS, JENNIFER K. ROBBEN-
NOLT & THOMAS S. ULEN, EMPIRICAL METHODS IN LAW 172 (2010). Likert scales are used 
frequently to collect data from mock jurors, although scholars have noted the limitations of 
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committed the robbery (1 = not at all likely and 7 = very likely). Par-
ticipants then rated their confidence in that decision and answered 
questions about the persuasiveness and strength of the prosecution’s 
and defense’s cases. Participants then answered questions regarding 
the persuasiveness, strength, trustworthiness, influence, and morali-
ty of each witness, the defendant, and the prosecutor.  
 Finally, participants answered free-response questions, which 
asked them to recall the events that occurred at trial, discuss specific 
pieces of evidence, and list any information they would have found 
helpful when evaluating the case. Participants then answered stand-
ard demographic questions. 
IV.   MAIN EXPERIMENT: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
A.   Overview 
 The results supported the hypotheses.105 Mock jurors were attuned 
to the prosecutor’s motivation to put forth hearsay evidence and drew 
negative inferences regarding the prosecutor’s motivation when there 
was not a satisfactory explanation for the prosecutor’s use of hearsay. 
This was particularly true when the hearsay was a poor substitute 
for the direct evidence. The analysis of these results will proceed in 
four parts: the results of the manipulation checks, participants’ per-
ceptions of the defendant’s guilt, their judgments about the strength 
of the prosecution’s case, and their judgments about individual pieces 
of evidence and trial actors. 
                                                                                                                  
this method. See, e.g., Gerald Albaum, The Likert Scale Revisited: An Alternate Version, 39 
J. MARKET RES. SOC’Y 331, 341 (1997). 
 105. Data were analyzed using (1) a two-way analysis of variance (ANOVA), which 
provides a statistical test of whether the means of several groups are equal, and (2) un-
paired t-tests for detecting differences in sample means. ANOVA results are represented 
by an F-statistic, t-tests are represented by a t-statistic, and the sizes of the effects are 
represented by ?2p. Means are denoted by the letter “M” and standard deviations are de-
noted by the letters “SD.” See generally LAWLESS ET AL., supra note 104 at 55-335 (explain-
ing empirical research methodologies and statistical techniques). 
Differences are denoted as “statistically significant” in this Article if the statistical 
tests indicate that the likelihood that the difference observed would occur by chance is 5% 
or less (as indicated by the p-value as p < 0.05). A difference is “marginally significant” if 
the likelihood of seeing such a difference by chance is greater than 5% but less than 10%. 
See Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and Legal Settlement: An Empirical Examination,
102 MICH. L. REV. 460, 485 n.117 (citing BARBARA G. TABACHNICK & LINDA S. FIDELL, US-
ING MULTIVARIATE STATISTICS (2d ed. 1989)). Planned t-test comparisons were accompa-
nied by Tukey-Kramer analyses to stabilize the “familywise error rate” and avoid false 
positives. See, e.g., James Jaccard, Michael A. Becker, & Gregory Wood, Pairwise Multiple 
Comparison Procedures: A Review, 96 PSYCHOL. BULL. 589 (1984) (discussing several tech-
niques, including the Tukey technique, for controlling Type I error when making multiple 
comparisons among groups). 
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B.   Manipulation Checks 
 After completing the questionnaires, and depending on the exper-
imental condition, participants rated how well either the 911 opera-
tor’s testimony or the 911 tape substituted for the testimony of the 
alleged eyewitness. The 911 tape106 was rated a significantly better 
substitute for the alleged eyewitness’s testimony than was the 911 
operator’s testimony.107
 Twenty pre-test participants, who did not otherwise participate in 
this study, rated the “suspiciousness” of the prosecutor’s decision to 
put forth hearsay evidence. The decision to proffer hearsay evidence 
because the hearsay declarant had died108 was rated significantly less 
suspicious than was the decision to proffer hearsay to deprive the 
defendant an opportunity to cross-examine the hearsay declarant.109
 Additionally, the free-response questions asked participants to 
provide a detailed account of their memory for the facts of the case. 
All participants correctly recalled the prosecutor’s motive for putting 
forth hearsay evidence if a motive had been provided to them. 
Thus, the manipulation checks confirmed that the substitution 
quality of the evidence differed appropriately, the strategies for prof-
fering hearsay differed with respect to their suspiciousness, and the 
participants understood the prosecutor’s motive for putting forth the 
evidence if a motive was provided to them. 
C.   Perceptions of Guilt 
 Preliminary analyses examined whether jurors prefer an eyewit-
ness’s in-court testimony to hearsay evidence. As seen in Figure 1, 
when the prosecutor proffered testimony directly from an eyewitness 
(instead of through hearsay evidence), mock jurors perceived the de-
fendant as more likely to be guilty110 and they perceived the prosecu-
tor’s case as stronger.111 Thus, in accordance with past research, ju-
rors found a declarant’s in-court testimony more persuasive than  
hearsay evidence. 
                                                                                                                  
 106. M = 5.01, SD = 1.04. 
 107. M = 3.23, SD = 1.18, F(1, 118) = 75.44, p < .001. 
 108. M = 5.22, SD = 0.83. 
 109. M = 2.89, SD = 1.05, F(1, 16) = 27.14, p < .001. 
 110. F(1,52) = 17.09, p < .001, ?2p = .25. M-in-court = 5.22, SD-in-court = 0.81; M-no-
motive-hearsay = 4.03, SD-no-motive-hearsay = 1.08 (see left-hand side of Figure 1). The 
data from the two “no motive” conditions (whose means were not significantly different 
from each other) were collapsed and averaged into one omnibus “no motive” hearsay condi-
tion that was compared to the in-court testimony condition. To simplify the analysis going 
forward, this “no motive” condition has been eliminated from most of the remaining anal-
yses, which will focus on the differences between participants who were exposed to benign 
hearsay and those who were exposed to suspicious hearsay. 
 111. F(1, 52) = 22.26, p < .001, ?2p = .30. M-in-court = 5.11, SD-in-court = 0.83; M-no-
motive-hearsay = 3.50, SD-no-motive-hearsay = 1.32 (see right-hand side of Figure 1). 
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Figure 1 
Juror Perceptions of In-Court Testimony and Hearsay 
 The next set of analyses examined the extent to which the prose-
cutor’s motivation for proffering hearsay evidence affected jurors’ 
perceptions of the defendant’s guilt. A 2 (motivation: benign vs. sus-
pect) x 2 (hearsay substitute: good vs. poor) analysis of variance 
(ANOVA)112 on participants’ perceptions of the defendant’s guilt re-
vealed a main effect of the prosecutor’s motivation:113 jurors were 
more likely to perceive the defendant as guilty when the prosecutor’s 
motive for proffering hearsay was benign114 than when his motive 
was suspicious.115 The analysis also revealed a marginally significant 
effect of hearsay substitute,116 such that jurors were more likely to 
perceive the defendant as guilty when the hearsay evidence was a 
good substitute117 than when it was poor.118
                                                                                                                  
 112. ANOVA assumes that the dependent measures are continuous variables. A Likert 
scale is technically an ordinal variable (participants cannot explicitly rate the defendant’s 
likelihood of guilt as 6.5; they must choose either 6 or 7). Thus, some may argue that an 
ordered probit regression, which does not assume that the dependent measures are contin-
uous, would be the most technically accurate analysis. Decades of psychological experi-
ments, however, have treated the Likert scale as a continuous variable appropriate for an 
ANOVA, on the theory that points 1 through 7 are simply markers along a continuous 
scale. See, e.g., Margaret E. Bell, Attitudes Toward Changing Economic Roles for Women, 6 
J. INSTRUCTIONAL PSYCHOL. 38 (1979) (analyzing Likert scale data using ANOVA); John D. 
Murray, Jo Ann Spadafore & William D. McIntosh, Belief in a Just World and Social Per-
ception: Evidence for Automatic Activation, 145 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 35, 38-42 (2005) (same). 
 113. F(1, 68) = 77.37, p < .001, ?2p = .53. 
114. M = 5.19, SD = 0.98. 
 115. M = 3.21, SD = 1.08. 
116. F(1, 68) = 2.37, p = .09, ?2p = .03.
 117. M = 4.38, SD = 1.15. 
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 Interestingly, the analyses revealed a significant interaction be-
tween the prosecutor’s motivation for proffering hearsay and the 
quality of the hearsay substitute.119 The nature of this interaction, 
which is shown in Figure 2, was examined by analyzing the effect of 
the prosecutor’s motivation when the evidence was good and that 
same effect when it was poor. 
 The prosecutor’s motivation for proffering hearsay affected jurors’ 
perceptions of the defendant’s guilt when the hearsay evidence was a 
good substitute;120 they perceived the defendant as guiltier when 
there was a benign motive behind the hearsay121 than when there 
was a suspect motive behind the hearsay.122 The same pattern existed 
when the hearsay evidence was a poor substitute123—benign hearsay 
led to perceptions of a guiltier defendant than did suspect hearsay—
but those perceptions were more polarized.124
 Further, when the prosecutor’s motive for proffering hearsay was 
not obvious, jurors perceived the defendant as less guilty than when 
the prosecutor’s motive was benign.125 This was true both when the 
hearsay evidence was good126 and when it was poor.127 This suggests 
that omitting the reason for depriving the factfinder of the “best” evi-
dence may be nearly as harmful to a party’s case as providing the 
factfinder a bad reason for doing so.128
                                                                                                                  
 119. F(1, 68) = 10.63, p = .002, ?2p = .14. See left-hand side of Figure 2. 
 120. F(1, 34) = 14.88, p < .001, ?2p = .30. 
 121. M = 5.00, SD = 0.97. 
 122. M = 3.75, SD = 0.97.   
 123. F(1. 34) = 74.89, p < .001, ?2p = .69. 
 124. M-benign = 5.39, SD-benign = 0.98; M-suspect = 2.67, SD-suspect = 0.91. See right-
hand side of Figure 2. 
 125. F(1, 68) = 24.30, p < .001, ?2p = .26. 
 126. F(1, 34) = 4.71, p = .037, ?2p = .12; M-benign = 5.00, SD-benign = 0.97; M-unknown 
= 4.39, SD-unknown = 0.70. 
 127. F(1, 34) = 20.50, p < .001, ?2p = .39; M-benign = 5.39, SD-benign = 0.98; M-
unknown = 3.67, SD-unknown = 1.28. 
 128. See id.
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Figure 2 
Likelihood of Defendant’s Guilt as a Function of Motivation and  
Substitution Quality 
D.   Strength of the Prosecutor’s Case 
 The third set of analyses examined participants’ judgments of the 
strength of the prosecution’s case. As Table 4 illustrates, the results 
follow largely the same pattern as participants’ judgments of the  
defendant’s guilt. 
 A 2 (motivation: benign vs. suspect) x 2 (hearsay substitute: good 
vs. poor) ANOVA on the strength of the prosecution’s case revealed a 
significant main effect of the prosecutor’s motivation,128 such that 
jurors perceived the prosecutor’s case as stronger when the prosecu-
tor provided hearsay for a benign reason129 than when the prosecutor 
had a suspect reason for providing hearsay evidence.130 The analysis 
also revealed a marginally significant effect of hearsay substitute,131
such that jurors perceived the prosecutor’s case as stronger when the 
hearsay evidence was a good substitute132 compared to when it was a  
poor substitute.133
 As illustrated in Figure 3, the analysis also revealed a significant 
interaction between the prosecutor’s motive and the quality of the 
hearsay evidence on jurors’ perceptions of the prosecutor’s case.134 As 
                                                                                                                  
 128. F(1, 68) = 60.20, p < .001, ?2p = .47. 
 129. M = 4.97, SD = 0.97. 
 130. M = 3.33, SD = 0.96. 
 131. F(1, 68) = 2.09, p = .10, ?2p = .03. 
 132. M = 4.31, SD = 1.01. 
 133. M = 4.00, SD = 1.47. 
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with the analysis of jurors’ perceptions of the defendant’s guilt, this 
analysis examined the effect of the prosecutor’s motivation when the 
hearsay was good and when it was poor. 
 When the hearsay evidence was a good substitute for the in-court 
testimony, the prosecutor’s motivation for proffering it affected ju-
rors’ perceptions of the strength of the prosecutor’s case.135 The prose-
cutor’s case was perceived as stronger when his motivation was be-
nign136 compared to when it was suspect.137 A similar pattern of re-
sults existed when the hearsay evidence was a poor substitute for the 
in-court testimony (although the results were more polarized),138 such 
that a benign motive for presenting hearsay evidence139 led jurors to 
perceive the prosecutor’s case as stronger than when his motivation  
was suspect.140
Figure 3 
Strength of Prosecutor’s Case as a Function of Motivation and  
Substitution Quality 
 In light of these findings, further analyses examined the possibil-
ity that the effect of the prosecutor’s motivation for proffering hear-
say on jurors’ perceptions of the defendant’s guilt may be mediated 
by jurors’ perceptions of the strength of the prosecutor’s case. In  
other words, the prosecutor’s motivation for proffering hearsay may 
affect jurors’ perceptions of the strength of the case against the  
                                                                                                                  
 135. F(1, 34) = 9.89,  p = .003, ?2p = .23. See left-hand side of Figure 3. 
 136. M = 4.78, SD = 1.06. 
 137. M = 3.83, SD = 0.71. 
 138. F(1, 34) = 61.70, p < .001, ?2p = .65. See right-hand side of Figure 3. 
 139. M = 5.17, SD = 0.86. 
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defendant, which in turn may affect jurors’ perceptions of the de-
fendant’s guilt. As illustrated in Figure 4, mediation analysis con-
firmed this hypothesis.141 The prosecutor’s motivation for proffering 
hearsay significantly predicted jurors’ perceptions of the prosecutor’s 
case,142 and perceptions of the prosecutor’s case, in turn, significantly 
predicted jurors’ perceptions of the defendant’s guilt.143
Figure 4 
Mediation Analysis 
E.   Judgments of the Evidence and Trial Actors 
 The final set of analyses examined participants’ impressions of the 
trial evidence and trial witnesses. Participants’ ratings of the persua-
siveness of the hearsay evidence revealed a significant main effect of 
motivation144 and an interaction between motivation and substitution 
quality.145 When the hearsay evidence presented was a good substi-
tute, it was deemed more persuasive when it was the result of a be-
nign motive146 than when it was the result of a suspicious motive.147
Weaker evidence intensified these effects.148 Mock jurors’ judgments 
                                                                                                                  
 141. Mediation analysis detects “when a predictor affects a dependent variable indi-
rectly through at least one intervening variable, or mediator.” Kristopher J. Preacher & 
Andrew F. Hayes, Asymptotic and Resampling Strategies for Assessing and Comparing 
Indirect Effects in Multiple Mediator Models, 40 BEHAV. RES. METHODS 879, 879 (2008). 
The mediation analysis reported in this Article is performed using a linear regression 
analysis and reports unstandardized coefficients, “B,” and standard errors, “SE.” It also 
reports standardized coefficients, “Beta.” 
 142. B = -.74, SE = .14, standardized Beta = -.46, p < .001. 
 143. B = .25, SE = .10, standardized Beta = -.24, p = .016. Moreover, the strength of the 
direct relationship between the prosecutor’s motive and jurors’ perceptions of the defend-
ant’s guilt (B = -.583, SE = .146, standardized Beta = -.36, p < .001) was weakened but still 
significant when the strength of the prosecutor’s case was included in the model as a medi-
ator (B = -.403, SE = .161, standardized Beta = -.25, p = .014). Thus, as predicted, the 
strength of the prosecutor’s case was a significant partial mediator of the relationship  
between the prosecutor’s motivation and jurors’ perceptions of the defendant’s guilt (Sobel’s 
Z = -2.23, p = .026). 
 144. F(1, 102) = 28.38, p < .001, ?2p = .556. 
 145. F(1, 102) = 5.12, p = .007, ?2p = .10. 
 146. M = 4.72, SD = 1.02. 
 147. M = 3.61, SD = 1.09, t(34) = 3.15, p = .003. 
 148. M-benign/poor = 5.44, SD = 1.04; M-suspicious/poor = 2.83, SD = 0.86, t(34) = 
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of the trustworthiness and strength of the hearsay evidence followed 
a similar pattern.  
 Mock jurors’ assessments of the moral character of the prosecutor 
revealed a significant main effect of motivation.149 The prosecutor 
was rated as more moral when he had a benign reason for introduc-
ing hearsay evidence150 than when he had a suspicious reason for do-
ing so.151 The same pattern holds for jurors’ views of the 911 operator 
who provided the hearsay evidence.152
 Participants’ impressions of the 911 caller were affected by the 
prosecutor’s motivation to proffer hearsay.153 When the prosecutor 
had a benign reason for using hearsay, participants viewed the 911 
caller as more moral154 than when the prosecutor had a suspicious 
motive for calling the 911 operator to the stand155 or when jurors 
were not told the prosecutor’s motive.156 They rated the 911 caller 
just as moral when the prosecutor put forth hearsay testimony for 
suspicious reasons,157 as when the prosecutor did not provide an ex-
planation for calling the 911 operator to the stand.158
V. FOLLOW-UP PILOT EXPERIMENTS
 To further strengthen the results obtained in the main experiment 
reported in this Article (the “Main Experiment”), I report the results 
of five short follow-up studies. The follow-up studies served two pur-
poses: (1) to better generalize the results to real-world settings and 
(2) to control for potential confounding factors that might explain the 
results reported in the Main Experiment.  
 These follow-up studies provide evidence that the results reported 
in the Main Experiment occur in a more realistic trial scenario and 
replicate across legal actors, across different types of cases, and 
across different types of hearsay evidence. Further, two potential 
confounding factors are eliminated as explanations for the results.  
                                                                                                                  
 149. F(2, 59) = 5.26, p = .008, ?2p  = .195. 
 150. M = 5.50, SD = 1.35. 
 151. M = 4.00, SD = 0.81, t(34) = 4.04, p < .001. Interestingly, jurors rated the prosecu-
tor as less moral when he provided no reason for proffering hearsay evidence (M = 4.40, SD
= 0.70) compared to a prosecutor who had a benign reason (M = 5.50, SD = 1.35), t(34) = 
3.07, p = .004. No significant difference emerged between participants’ morality ratings for 
a prosecutor who provided no explanation (M = 4.40, SD = 0.70) and one who had a suspi-
cious motive for proffering the evidence (M = 4.00, SD = 0.81), t(34) = 1.59, p = .122. These 
prosecutors were viewed as equally moral, and participants viewed both as less moral than 
the prosecutor who had a benign reason for introducing hearsay. 
 152. F(2, 59) = 3.64, p = .03, ?2p  = .117. 
 153. F(2, 59) = 10.56, p < .0001, ?2p  = .28. 
 154. M = 5.20, SD = 1.14. 
 155. M = 3.40, SD = 1.65, t(34) = 3.81, p = .001. 
 156. M = 4.00, SD = 1.15, t(34) = 3.14, p = .003. 
 157. M = 3.40, SD = 1.65. 
 158. M = 4.00, SD = 1.15, t(34) = 1.27, p = .214. 
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A.   Generalizability 
 Experimental methods allow for greater control and clearer 
statements of cause and effect compared to observational or correla-
tional studies.159 Experimental methods are vulnerable, however, to 
critiques that they do not measure phenomena as they occur in real 
life.160 Experimenters can respond to these critiques by demonstrat-
ing that the phenomenon exists in myriad experimental contexts us-
ing varied methods. In the absence of perfect external validity,161
such varied results serve as convergent evidence that the phenome-
non demonstrated in the laboratory is robust. 
 I designed three short experiments to increase the generalizability 
of the results reported in the Main Experiment. These studies test 
whether jurors scrutinize (1) the motivation behind proffered hearsay 
when the motivation is not obvious, (2) the motivation behind the tri-
al strategies of criminal defendants and civil plaintiffs, and (3) the 
motivation behind hearsay that courts would deem inadmissible.  
1. Follow-Up Study 1: Imperfect Motivational Information 
 The Main Experiment informed participants of the prosecutor’s 
motivation to proffer hearsay through a “God’s-eye view.” The ma-
nipulation was purposefully heavy handed; it was designed to test 
whether perfect information regarding a party’s motive for proffering 
hearsay would inform jurors’ judgments when they assigned proba-
tive weight to the hearsay evidence. The experiment suggests that 
jurors do so. 
 But jurors will rarely have perfect information regarding a party’s 
strategy for proffering hearsay evidence. When jurors have imperfect
information regarding a party’s strategy to proffer hearsay evidence, 
does that imperfect information affect their judgments of the weight 
of the hearsay evidence? I designed this follow-up study to answer 
that question in a manner that more closely mirrors the circumstanc-
es surrounding a real trial. 
(a)   Methodology 
 This experiment employed the robbery vignette used in the Main 
Experiment, albeit with several modifications. The motivation of the 
prosecutor to proffer hearsay was manipulated, as was the substitu-
tion quality of the evidence. Participants filled out questionnaires 
                                                                                                                  
 159. See Robbennolt, supra note 105, at 483. 
 160. See, e.g., Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod, Increasing Jurors’ Participation in Trials: 
A Field Experiment with Jury Notetaking and Question Asking, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
231, 232 (1988). A more detailed discussion and response to this critique is reserved for 
Part VI, infra.
 161. See discussion infra in Part VI. 
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and free-response items that asked questions regarding the prosecutor’s 
decision to proffer hearsay, just as they did in the Main Experiment. 
 The manipulation of the prosecutor’s motive was designed to be 
substantially subtler in this version of the experiment. Participants 
in the “benign motive” condition read a lengthy cross-examination of 
the police officer by the defense attorney, who asked the officer sev-
eral questions regarding the eyewitness declarant. During the collo-
quy, the police officer offhandedly mentioned that the eyewitness had 
died of an unrelated illness before trial.  
 Participants in the “suspicious motive” condition also read a 
lengthy cross-examination of the police officer by the defense attor-
ney. In questioning the officer regarding her dealings with the eye-
witness, the defense attorney elicited from the officer that she had 
spoken with the eyewitness as recently as the morning of the trial 
and that the witness lived and worked in the area. The defense at-
torney then asked the officer if she knew whether the eyewitness 
planned to testify, which drew an objection from the prosecutor. The 
defense attorney then withdrew the question. 
 Finally, participants in the “blind motive” condition read a cross-
examination that did not bear on the prosecutor’s potential motiva-
tion for declining to call the declarant.162 All participants then com-
pleted the questionnaires. 
(b)   Results and Discussion 
 Jurors take a party’s motivation for proffering hearsay into ac-
count when evaluating the evidence even when the prosecutor’s mo-
tive is less obvious. A two-way ANOVA revealed results remarkably 
similar to those reported in the Main Experiment: a main effect of 
motivation,163 such that benign hearsay164 led to greater perceptions 
of the defendant’s guilt than did suspicious hearsay;165 and a main 
effect of substitution quality,166 such that a good hearsay substitute167
led to greater perceptions of the defendant’s guilt than did a poor  
hearsay substitute.168
 As illustrated in Figure 5, when the hearsay evidence was strong, 
jurors deemed the evidence more convincing when the facts suggest-
ed that the prosecutor had a benign reason for proffering it compared 
                                                                                                                  
 162. As in the Main Experiment, this condition was omitted to simplify the remaining 
analyses (specifically, to focus on the differences between participants who were exposed to 
benign hearsay and those who were exposed to suspicious hearsay).  
 163. F(1, 68) = 116.50, p < .001, ?2p = .63. 
 164. M = 4.78, SD = 0.99. 
 165. M = 2.33, SD = 1.04. 
 166. F(1, 68) = 10.17, p = .002, ?2p = .13. 
 167. M = 3.92, SD = 1.56. 
 168. M = 3.19, SD = 1.56. 
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to a suspicious reason.169 A similar pattern emerged when the hear-
say served as a poor substitute for the in-court testimony.170
Figure 5 
Likelihood of Defendant’s Guilt as a Function of Motivation and  
Substitution Quality 
 Thus, this follow-up experiment suggests not only that jurors take 
into account a party’s motivation when assigning probative weight to 
hearsay, but also that they do so with imperfect information. 
2. Follow-Up Study 2: Criminal Defendants and Civil Plaintiffs 
 The Main Experiment suggests that jurors examine a prosecutor’s 
motivation for proffering hearsay when deciding what probative 
weight to assign the evidence. It is not obvious, however, that jurors 
will examine the motive of other legal actors, including criminal de-
fense attorneys or civil litigants. 
 There are reasons to believe that jurors might view a prosecutor’s 
motive for putting forth hearsay differently from a defense attorney’s 
motive for doing so. Unlike some litigants, prosecutors always bear 
the burden of proof and are tasked with additional ethical duties be-
yond those required of other attorneys.171 These additional ethical 
                                                                                                                  
 169. M-benign = 5.17, SD-benign = 0.92; M-suspect = 2.67, SD-suspect = 2.67; F(1, 34) = 
67.11, p < .001, ?2p = .67 (see left-hand side of Figure 3).  
 170. M-benign = 4.39, SD-benign = 0.92; M-suspect = 2.00, SD-suspect = 1.08; F(1, 34 = 
50.95, p < .001, ?2p = .60 (see right-hand side of Figure 3). 
 171. See, e.g., Chris G. McDonough, Diana Brusca McDonough & Raymond G. Keenan, 
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duties may reflect a consensus among the legal profession, and 
among the population at large, that prosecutors should be held to 
higher standards when presenting their cases, because the liberty or 
even the life of the defendant is at stake.172 As a result, jurors might 
hold prosecutors to higher standards with respect to the evidence 
that prosecutors put forth to prove the defendant guilty of a crime. 
Jurors might, therefore, bristle at a prosecutor’s suspicious motive for 
proffering hearsay, particularly when the hearsay is the centerpiece 
of the prosecutor’s case, whereas they might not react similarly to a 
defendant’s (or civil litigant’s) suspicious motive. 
 Conversely, public opinion polls suggest that Americans are suspi-
cious of trial tactics employed by criminal defense attorneys.173 Jurors 
might be even more suspicious of a defense attorney’s strategy to 
provide weaker evidence of trial facts. Thus, we might expect the re-
sults reported in the Main Experiment to be even more pronounced if 
the party providing the hearsay evidence is a defense attorney in-
stead of a prosecutor. 
 In sum, different hypotheses can be formed as to whether the re-
sults reported in the Main Experiment are universal—that is, 
whether the results are replicable to other actors in the criminal sys-
tem and to actors involved in civil causes of action. Two follow-up ex-
periments addressed these hypotheses. 
(a)   Criminal Defendants: Methodology 
 The methodology for this follow-up experiment was similar to the 
methodology employed in the Main Experiment. Participants read a 
robbery trial vignette in which an attorney’s motivation for proffering 
hearsay evidence was either “benign,” “suspicious,” or “blind.” Fur-
ther, the hearsay evidence provided was either a good or a poor sub-
stitute for the declarant’s in-court testimony. 
 This experiment contained two important differences, however. 
This time the criminal defense attorney, not the prosecutor, proffered 
the hearsay evidence. Also, in addition to rating the defendant’s likeli-
hood of guilt, mock jurors rendered binary “guilty/not guilty” judgments. 
 In this version of the robbery vignette, the eyewitness apparently 
identified to the 911 operator someone other than the defendant. The 
defense attorney introduced this evidence at the trial but did not call 
the eyewitness to the stand. Instead, the defense attorney proffered 
                                                                                                                  
(detailing the myriad additional ethical considerations facing prosecutors, including the 
pretrial investigation, arrest, decision to prosecute, charging determination, and arraign-
ment of the defendant). 
 172. Id.
 173. See, e.g., BELDEN RUSSONELLO & STEWART, DEVELOPING A NATIONAL MESSAGE 
FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE: ANALYSIS OF NATIONAL SURVEY 18 (2001), available at 
http://www.nlada.org/DMS/Documents/1211996548.53/Polling%20results%20report.pdf. 
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either the tape of the eyewitness’s 911 call or had the 911 operator 
recount her conversation with the eyewitness. Participants read the 
vignette and completed questionnaires about the trial. 
(b)   Results and Discussion 
 Jurors appear to treat defense attorneys no better—and no 
worse—than prosecutors with respect to their decisions to proffer 
weaker evidence of trial facts. 
 With respect to participants’ judgments of the likelihood of the 
defendant’s guilt, the results from this follow-up study mirror the 
results reported in the Main Experiment. The results revealed a sta-
tistically significant main effect of motivation,174 a significant main 
effect of substitution quality,175 and a significant interaction between 
motivation and substitution value.176 As in the Main Experiment, 
participants’ judgments were affected by the prosecutor’s motivation 
for proffering hearsay and the quality of the hearsay that was prof-
fered in place of the declarant’s in-court testimony. 
 The defense attorney’s decision to proffer hearsay evidence also 
affected jurors’ verdicts with respect to the defendant’s guilt. A chi-
square test of independence revealed a statistically significant differ-
ence in the proportion of guilty verdicts rendered as a function of the 
defense attorney’s motivation for proffering hearsay.177 As shown in 
Figure 6, participants were more likely to convict the defendant of 
robbery when the defense attorney’s motive was suspicious compared 
to when it was benign (and vice versa).178
                                                                                                                  
 174. F(2, 50) = 5.82, p = .01. 
 175. F(1, 50) = 4.08, p = .03. 
 176. F(2, 50) = 4.24, p = .04. 
 177. ?2(2, N = 60) = 11.46, p = .003.  
 178. ?2(1, N = 39) = 15.83, p < .001. Jurors were also more likely to convict the defend-
ant when the prosecutor had a suspect motive compared to when the prosecutor’s motive 
was unknown, ?2(1, N = 41) = 5.27, p = .072 (marginally significant) (post-hoc Marascuilo 
comparisons of multiple proportions). 
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Figure 6 
Criminal Verdicts Rendered 
 These results suggest that jurors do not distinguish between pros-
ecutors and defense attorneys in evaluating their motivation for prof-
fering hearsay. Whether an attorney represents the government or 
the accused, it appears that a perceived suspicious motive affects ju-
rors’ judgments of the hearsay evidence, their judgments of the like-
lihood of the defendant’s guilt, and their likelihood to convict the de-
fendant of the crime at issue. The next experiment examines whether 
jurors behave similarly in the context of civil disputes. 
(c)   Civil Plaintiffs: Methodology 
 The methodology for this follow-up experiment was nearly identi-
cal to the methodology employed in the Main Experiment, with slight 
modifications. First, instead of a criminal robbery trial, the trial was 
framed as a civil wrongful death action in which the convenience 
store clerk’s estate sued the defendant. The same evidence that was 
provided in the Main Experiment was provided to participants in this 
study. The prosecutor’s motive was either benign, suspicious, or un-
known, and the plaintiff proffered either a 911 tape of the eyewitness’s 
conversation with the 911 operator or produced the 911 operator to 
testify as a hearsay witness. Participants completed questionnaires 
similar to those completed by participants in the Main Experiment.  
(d)   Results and Discussion 
 If jurors’ expectations of the quality of the evidence proffered by 
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evidence proffered by other attorneys (here, civil plaintiffs’ attor-
neys), we would expect different results from those obtained in the  
Main Experiment. 
 The results of this follow-up study suggest that jurors do not treat 
plaintiffs’ attorneys differently from prosecutors with respect to the 
weight they assign hearsay evidence. As in the Main Experiment, 
this study revealed a significant main effect of motivation,179 a signif-
icant main effect of evidence substitution quality,180 and a significant 
interaction of these variables.181 Again, the plaintiff’s motivation af-
fected jurors’ views of the hearsay evidence and ultimately their 
views of the likelihood that the defendant caused the death of the 
convenience store clerk. 
 As in the previous follow-up study, the plaintiff’s motivation for 
proffering hearsay evidence affected not only jurors’ views of the like-
lihood that the defendant caused the clerk’s death, but also their ul-
timate judgments of the defendant’s civil liability.182 As shown in 
Figure 7, jurors more frequently found by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the defendant caused the clerk’s death when the plaintiff 
proffered hearsay evidence for a benign reason than when the plain-
tiff proffered it for a suspicious reason.183 Conversely, jurors found 
the defendant liable less frequently when the plaintiff proffered 
hearsay for a suspicious reason compared to plaintiffs who proffered 
hearsay for a benign reason. 
                                                                                                                  
 179. F(2, 43) = 6.02, p = .01. 
 180. F(1, 43) = 2.91, p = .035. 
 181. F(2, 43) = 3.84, p = .02. 
 182. ?2(2, N = 57) = 8.30, p = .016. 
 183. ?2(1, N = 37) = 10.83, p = .005 (post-hoc Marascuilo comparison of multiple proportions). 
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Figure 7 
Civil Verdicts Rendered 
 In sum, these follow-up studies suggest that jurors’ evaluation of 
hearsay evidence shows no bias toward a particular legal actor—
prosecutor, defense attorney, or plaintiff’s attorney—or toward a le-
gal case—civil or criminal. Jurors pervasively discount hearsay evi-
dence when parties proffer it for unseemly reasons. But is this true 
for all types of hearsay? Do jurors analyze hearsay that is deemed 
inadmissible the same way, even though policymakers deem inad-
missible hearsay less reliable than admissible hearsay? The next fol-
low-up study examines these questions. 
3. Follow-Up Study 3: Inadmissible Hearsay 
 The weaker evidence at issue in the Main Experiment consisted of 
either a 911 tape recording or the direct testimony of the 911 opera-
tor, who recalled her conversation with the 911 caller. In both in-
stances, the evidence was admissible hearsay, because both pieces of 
evidence fit the excited utterance and present sense impression ex-
ceptions to the general bar against hearsay evidence.184 Further, the 
hearsay evidence is non-testimonial under the United States Su-
preme Court’s Confrontation Clause jurisprudence and is therefore 
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admissible if the hearsay is more probative than it is prejudicial and 
falls within one of the exceptions to the hearsay bar.185
 Some might argue that admissible hearsay is exactly the wrong 
type of evidence to use in examining whether jurors think critically 
about hearsay. They argue that, because it is admissible, this type of 
hearsay is inherently more reliable than is inadmissible hearsay,186 and 
it may not be surprising that jurors think critically when evaluating it. 
 Jurors, however, generally do not distinguish between admissible 
and inadmissible hearsay. Indeed, empirical evidence suggests that 
jurors generally cannot consciously recognize hearsay at all, and 
cannot categorize it.187 Moreover, the view that admissible hearsay is 
more reliable than inadmissible hearsay is based on untested folk 
wisdom that may not be accurate. 
 Nonetheless, I devised the following experiment using inadmissi-
ble hearsay evidence to determine whether jurors also think critically 
about a party’s motivation to proffer inadmissible hearsay. If jurors 
evaluate inadmissible hearsay in the same manner in which they 
evaluate admissible hearsay, then the generalizability of the results 
obtained in the Main Experiment increases. 
(a)   Methodology 
 Mock jurors read a vignette in which a knife company sued anoth-
er knife company for unfair competition in “palming off” a knife made 
by the defendant to look like the knife made by the plaintiff.188 The 
plaintiff offered into evidence a letter written by a wholesaler. The 
letter read, “We did not find this knife in your catalogue, and we are 
highly confused because we think it is yours. Is it yours?”189   
 The plaintiff did not call the author of the letter to the stand to 
testify, and participants learned either that the author had died be-
                                                                                                                  
 185. See, e.g., Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011) (ruling that only “testimonial” 
hearsay statements, where the defendant has not had an opportunity to cross-examine the 
out-of-court speaker, violate the Confrontation Clause); Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 
(2008); Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 
(2004). A fuller discussion of the Confrontation Clause is reserved for Part VI, infra.
 186. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee’s note (“The present rule proceeds 
upon the theory that under appropriate circumstances a hearsay statement may possess 
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness sufficient to justify nonproduction of the 
declarant in person at the trial even though he may be available.”). 
 187. See Paglia & Schuller, supra note 59, at 514-15 (finding that jurors have “difficul-
ty with the fine-grained distinction required of the limiting instructions,” which instruct 
the jury to use hearsay information for one purpose but not another). 
 188. “Palming off” is a legal term for misrepresenting one’s goods as goods made by 
another. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1219, 1233 (9th Ed. 2009).  
 189. This letter is inadmissible hearsay. The plaintiff is attempting to admit the out-of-
court statement into evidence for its truth value—that the knife looks identical to the 
plaintiff’s knife—and the letter does not fit an exception to the hearsay rule. See FED. R.
EVID. 801(c), 803. 
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fore trial, that the plaintiff declined to call the author because of con-
cerns that the author would not be a good witness, or learned nothing 
regarding the reason for the author’s absence. Participants then 
filled out questionnaires in which they were asked to determine 
whether the defendant was liable to the plaintiff. 
(b)   Results and Discussion 
 If the results from the Main Experiment are not generalizable to 
other types of hearsay evidence, then we would expect different re-
sults in this follow-up study. The study, however, supports the hy-
pothesis that this behavioral phenomenon—that jurors bristle at re-
ceiving weaker evidence and examine a party’s motivation for provid-
ing it—is not limited to excited utterances or present sense impres-
sions. Rather, this phenomenon appears to extend to inadmissible 
hearsay as well. 
 The results from the follow-up study mirror the results from the 
Main Experiment. A chi-square analysis reveals that the plaintiff’s 
motivation for proffering hearsay affected jurors’ judgments that the 
defendant “palmed off” the knife.190 As shown in Figure 8, partici-
pants more frequently found the defendant liable for unfair competi-
tion when they were exposed to a benign-intentioned plaintiff com-
pared to a suspicious-intentioned plaintiff.191 Conversely, participants 
more frequently found the defendant “not liable” when the plaintiff’s 
intentions were suspicious. 
                                                                                                                  
 190. ?2(2, N = 69) = 12.55, p = .002. 
 191. ?2(1, N = 46) = 17.25, p < .001 (post-hoc Marascuilo comparison of multiple proportions). 
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Figure 8 
Civil Verdicts Rendered 
 These results suggest that not only do jurors make motivational 
inferences with respect to the trial strategy of various legal actors to 
proffer admissible hearsay, but also that the same phenomenon ap-
pears to exist when evaluating inadmissible hearsay—that is, hear-
say that policymakers deem less reliable and that jurors may have 
more difficulty evaluating. In sum, jurors appear to critically evalu-
ate hearsay regardless of the legal actor who proffers it. Further, ju-
rors’ critical evaluations are not limited to specifics types of hearsay. 
B.   Potential Confounds 
 The follow-up experiments reported in Part A suggest that jurors 
critically evaluate a party’s strategy for proffering hearsay evidence, 
which affects the probative weight that they assign the evidence.  
 These experiments, however, do not eliminate the possibility that 
confounding factors influenced the results of the Main Experiment. A 
confounding factor is a rival explanation for the association between 
two variables or phenomena.192 If confounding factors exist, it be-
comes difficult to make clear statements of experimental cause and 
                                                                                                                  
 192. For example, “if both a decrease in the speed limit and a new seatbelt law precede 
a [decrease] in traffic fatalities, the seatbelt law would” be a confounding factor with re-
spect to an assertion that the decrease in the speed limit caused the drop in fatalities. “[T]o 
attribute cause to the [lowered] speed limit, [the seatbelt explanation] must be controlled 
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effect. It is therefore important to eliminate confounding factors as 
an explanation for the experimental results. 
 The final follow-up studies address two confounds that may have 
affected the results of the Main Experiment: (1) the perceived  
credibility of the available hearsay declarant; and (2) the possibility 
that the questionnaire format measured participants’ “test taking” 
abilities and not their true underlying assessments of how a party’s 
trial strategy affects jurors’ perceptions of the probative value of  
hearsay evidence. 
1. Follow-Up Study 4: The Declarant’s Credibility 
 In the Main Experiment, the 911 caller did not testify either be-
cause he had died or because the prosecutor worried that the caller 
would not be a good witness. The possibility exists that, in discredit-
ing the hearsay stemming from the available declarant, jurors might 
have speculated that the hearsay declarant was inherently less cred-
ible; for example, jurors might have believed that the declarant had a 
prior conviction on his record. I designed the following experiment to 
determine whether it is the prosecutor’s decision not to call the wit-
ness or the witness’s perceived credibility that jurors are attuned to 
when they weigh the probative value of the hearsay evidence. 
(a)   Methodology 
 This study was a truncated version of the Main Experiment. Par-
ticipants read the robbery vignette, but the eyewitness always had a 
prior conviction on his record that could damage his credibility. Half 
of the participants learned that the prosecutor proffered hearsay be-
cause the declarant had died before trial, and half of the participants 
learned that the prosecutor proffered hearsay evidence because the 
declarant might not make a good witness. Participants then rated the 
appropriateness of the prosecutor’s decision to proffer hearsay evi-
dence. They also rated the probative weight of the hearsay and ex-
plained the reason for their decision.  
(b)   Results and Discussion 
 If the declarant’s perceived credibility explains the results of the 
Main Experiment, then we would expect the participants in this fol-
low-up study to rate the appropriateness of the prosecutor’s decision 
the same regardless of experimental condition. Here, both declar-
ants—the one who died and the one who was alive but did not testi-
fy—had prior convictions that would affect their credibility. If, how-
ever, the decision to proffer hearsay instead of the live declarant’s in-
court testimony is driving the results of the Main Experiment, we 
would expect the participants in this follow-up study to statistically 
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differ with respect to their judgments of the appropriateness of the  
prosecutor’s decision. 
 The results support the latter hypothesis. Figure 9 reveals that 
participants exposed to hearsay because the declarant died before 
trial rated the prosecutor’s decision to proffer hearsay as significantly 
more appropriate than did participants exposed to hearsay because 
the prosecutor did not want to call the declarant as a witness.193
Moreover, these latter participants frequently cited as their reason 
for discounting suspect hearsay that the declarant’s underlying 
statement was untrustworthy.194
Figure 9 
Judgments of the Appropriateness of the Decision to Proffer Hearsay 
 These results provide evidence that the credibility of the declarant 
does not explain the results reported in the Main Experiment. Ra-
ther, it appears that the prosecutor’s refusal to call the “best” witness 
led jurors to draw negative inferences about the hearsay evidence 
independent of the hearsay declarant’s credibility. 
2. Follow-Up Study 5: Savvy Test Takers 
 As with most vignette studies, it is possible that the Main Exper-
iment measured participants’ test taking abilities instead of the un-
                                                                                                                  
 193. M-benign prosecutor = 5.28, SD = 1.15, M-suspicious prosecutor = 3.01, SD = 0.94, 
t(32) = 6.00, p < .001. Higher ratings indicate that the decision is deemed appropriate.  
 194. This explanation was compared against explanations that focused on punishing 
the prosecutor for her decision. Explanations that focused on the trustworthiness of the 
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derlying psychological or behavioral phenomenon at issue. Some 
might argue that participants were simply penalizing the prosecutor 
because the experiment made it obvious that the participants should  
do so. 
 To determine whether savvy test taking explains the results of the 
Main Experiment, a less direct method of evaluating how jurors re-
spond to potentially unseemly strategic decisions by legal actors is 
necessary. I constructed a follow-up study in which participants (who 
thought that the experiment had concluded) chose between ballpoint 
pens and bottles of Purell® hand sanitizer after reading a trial vi-
gnette in which the prosecutor proffered hearsay.195 If jurors choose 
the Purell bottle more frequently when the prosecutor’s motive is 
suspicious, this is evidence that the prosecutor’s motivation affects 
jurors on a more visceral level. 
(a)   Methodology 
 As in the Main Experiment, participants learned of either a be-
nign-intentioned prosecutor or a suspicious-intentioned prosecutor 
who proffered hearsay evidence. Instead of rating the appropriate-
ness of the prosecutor’s actions, however, participants completed 
reading comprehension questions and “distracter” items, including a 
word search and sentence completion tasks. 
 Upon completing the experiment, I provided the participants a 
choice of two items as compensation for their participation: a ball-
point pen or a small bottle of Purell hand sanitizer.196 After choosing 
an item, participants were debriefed and dismissed. 
(b)   Results and Discussion 
 This follow-up study examined indirectly whether participants in 
the Main Experiment were simply savvy test-takers, or whether they 
more viscerally objected to the use of hearsay when the best evidence 
of a trial fact is available. If participants are simply savvy test-
takers, there should be no difference in the proportion of Purell bot-
tles selected and the proportion of ballpoint pens selected by the par-
ticipants, because the prize selection was (in the participants’ eyes) 
not part of the experiment. If, however, a suspicious trial strategy 
affects jurors on a more visceral level, that reaction may bleed into 
their choice of prize. In essence, participants exposed to a suspicious-
intentioned prosecutor should select the Purell bottle more frequently 
                                                                                                                  
 195. This experimental design was created by Kenworthey Bilz in a study of the exclu-
sionary rule. See Kenworthey Bilz, Dirty Hands or Deterrence? An Experimental Examina-
tion of the Exclusionary Rule, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 149, 163 (2012). 
 196. Both items have approximately the same retail value and pretest subjects rated 
the prizes as equally desirable. See id.
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than the ballpoint pen, while participants exposed to the benign-
intentioned prosecutor should choose the pen and the Purell bottle in 
relatively equal amounts. 
 The results are displayed in Figure 10 below. A chi-square test of 
independence revealed a statistically significant difference in the 
proportions of prizes chosen by participants. Specifically, participants 
chose the Purell bottle with significantly greater frequency when 
they were exposed to a suspicious-intentioned prosecutor than when 
they were exposed to the benign-intentioned prosecutor.197 Indeed, 
participants exposed to the suspicious-intentioned prosecutor over-
whelmingly chose the Purell bottle, whereas participants exposed to 
the benign-intentioned prosecutor chose the Purell bottle and the pen 
in roughly equal numbers. 
Figure 10 
Participants’ Prize Choice 
 These results strongly suggest that participants in the Main Ex-
periment (and in the subsequent follow-up studies) were not simply 
perceptive test takers. Rather, a party’s decision to proffer subopti-
mal evidence when the party could have provided the best evidence of 
a trial fact appears to affect participants in a visceral manner. 
VI.   IMPLICATIONS, OBJECTIONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH
 The Main Experiment posed two related questions. First, are ju-
rors attuned to a party’s motivation to put forth hearsay evidence 
instead of a declarant’s in-court testimony? Second, when a satisfac-
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tory reason for proffering hearsay evidence is not obvious to jurors, 
do they draw spontaneous inferences regarding the party’s motiva-
tion, and do those inferences affect their legal judgments?  
 The Main Experiment answers these questions in the affirmative. 
Jurors were attuned to the prosecutor’s motivation to put forth hear-
say evidence, as reflected in their judgments of the defendant’s guilt. 
When a benign motive for the hearsay evidence was made salient, 
jurors discounted the hearsay significantly less than they did when a 
suspicious motive for the hearsay evidence was made salient. In 
short, a suspicious motive for putting forth hearsay evidence will not 
go unnoticed by a jury. This appears to be true even when a defend-
ant proffers the evidence, even in the context of civil trials, and even 
with respect to different types of hearsay evidence. 
 Interestingly, when a party puts forth hearsay that is a particu-
larly poor substitute for the declarant’s in-court testimony, the moti-
vation behind that strategic choice became even more salient to mock 
jurors. Jurors placed a greater discount on hearsay evidence when it 
was poor quality and the product of a suspicious motive than when 
the hearsay was high quality and a product of a suspicious motive. 
 The results from this study also suggest that jurors spontaneously 
draw inferences regarding a party’s motivation for introducing hear-
say evidence when a reason for doing so is not obvious. Jurors appear 
skeptical of the decision to proffer hearsay, and they attribute suspi-
cious motives to a party that fails to explain why she has not offered 
stronger evidence.198 Jurors were just as likely to convict a defendant 
when the prosecution’s case contained “suspicious” hearsay as when 
jurors were not aware of the reason for the hearsay evidence. But 
when a benign motive for proffering the hearsay was made salient  
to jurors, they weighed the hearsay more heavily and were more  
likely to convict the defendant. Altogether, the results from these 
studies suggest that jurors consider a party’s strategy for proffering 
hearsay evidence an important variable when evaluating the quality 
of that evidence. 
 These effects extended beyond global judgments of the defendant’s 
guilt. The prosecutor’s motivation to use hearsay evidence also af-
fected judgments of the prosecution’s case, judgments of the individ-
ual witnesses, and perceptions of the strength, persuasiveness, 
trustworthiness, and moral force of the evidence presented. Jurors 
viewed the prosecutor’s case as less persuasive when he had a sus-
                                                                                                                  
 198. The responses of study participants to qualitative free-response questions bolster 
this interpretation of the results. A supermajority of participants who were not told the 
reason for receiving hearsay evidence expressed concern regarding the declarant’s failure  
to testify. 
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pect reason for proffering hearsay.199 They found the 911 operator 
much less persuasive and trustworthy when the prosecutor had a 
suspect motive for calling the 911 operator to testify.200 A suspect  
motive for proffering hearsay evidence caused mock jurors to view 
the prosecutor as less moral than when the prosecutor had a benign  
motive for putting forth hearsay. And jurors perceived the 911  
caller as less moral when the prosecutor had a suspect motive for  
proffering hearsay.  
 Follow-up experiments shed additional light on how jurors think 
about an attorney’s trial strategy when assigning probative weight to 
evidence. Jurors make motivational inferences even when they are 
not explicitly told why an attorney has proffered hearsay and instead 
must glean the attorney’s motivation from the circumstances under 
which the evidence is presented. Moreover, they make these infer-
ences regardless of whether it is a criminal prosecutor, a criminal 
defendant, or a civil plaintiff who proffers hearsay evidence, and 
these inferences affect their verdicts as well. Jurors also make these 
inferences regardless of whether the hearsay is admissible or inad-
missible. Confounding factors, including demand effects201 and the 
credibility of the hearsay declarant, do not explain these results. 
 Even assuming that the experimental results reported in this Ar-
ticle reflect mock jurors’ true mental processes when evaluating a 
party’s strategy for proffering hearsay evidence, some might argue 
that jurors are acting irrationally. They might argue that regardless 
of a party’s motivation to proffer hearsay evidence, the underlying 
hearsay evidence is the same. Therefore, jurors are focusing on irrel-
evant factors when assigning weight to hearsay evidence. This argu-
ment misses an important point: Because of the additional motiva-
tional inferences that jurors can make when a declarant is available 
but is not called to testify, the underlying hearsay evidence is not
the same. Realizing that the “best” witness to some trial fact could 
have been called—but was not called—allows jurors to come to the 
                                                                                                                  
 199. Moreover, they viewed the prosecutor’s case as less persuasive when he did not 
provide a reason for proffering hearsay, which suggests that jurors suspected that there 
were probative weaknesses in the declarant’s testimony that the prosecutor was attempt-
ing to obscure. 
 200. It is not the case that jurors are simply imputing some impure motive onto the 911 
operator by association with an overtly suspicious prosecutor. The 911 operator was seen 
as less moral even when the prosecutor’s motive remained unarticulated. 
 201. A demand effect is an effect wherein participants form an interpretation of the 
experiment's purpose and unconsciously change their behavior to fit that interpretation. 
See, e.g., Martin T. Orne, Demand Characteristics and the Concept of Quasi-Controls, in
ARTIFACTS IN BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH 110, 110 (Robert Rosenthal & Ralph L. Rosnow eds., 
2009) (“Special methodological problems are raised when human subjects are used in psy-
chological experiments, mainly because subjects’ thoughts about an experiment may affect 
their behavior in carrying out the experimental task.”). 
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reasonable conclusion that there are likely to be probative weakness-
es in the declarant’s testimony.202
 Nonetheless, some may argue that there are myriad reasons why 
a party might fail to call the “best” witness, and so a juror’s default 
assumption that the declarant’s testimony must contain probative 
weaknesses will not always be accurate. This may be true sometimes. 
Nonetheless, it may not be the most useful way in which to evaluate 
juror decisionmaking. In a real trial, we never know with absolute 
certainty whether or not a defendant has committed a crime. Thus, 
defining “accuracy” in this way is not particularly meaningful be-
cause we cannot measure the accuracy of factfinders’ verdicts in real 
trials.203 What we can measure, however, is whether information that 
should be relevant to jurors is, in fact, relevant to them and informs 
their judgments. To the extent that relevant information does inform 
their judgments, this is evidence of good decisionmaking. The experi-
ments reported in this Article suggest that jurors make use of relevant 
information surrounding a party’s decision to proffer hearsay evidence. 
 Altogether, these findings suggest that a party’s strategic deci-
sions at trial play a crucial role in explaining how jurors evaluate 
hearsay. They also have implications for the jury as an institution 
and for trial attorneys. 
A.   Legal Implications 
1. Juror Decisionmaking 
 The results reported in this Article provide new information re-
garding how jurors process evidence. Recall that past research sug-
gests that judgments of the persuasiveness of an argument are af-
fected by the perceived motivation of the presenter. For example, 
mock jurors were able to disregard potentially prejudicial pretrial 
publicity when they had reason to believe that the disseminator of 
that publicity was biased against the defendant.204 This social psycho-
logical phenomenon extends not only to pretrial publicity, but also to 
                                                                                                                  
 202. Some might also wonder whether jurors were simply punishing the prosecutor 
because he may have been trying to hide evidence from them—a perceived moral failing 
that is irrelevant to the probative value of the evidence. The experiments do not support 
this explanation. When asked why they were discounting the evidence, participants more 
often listed reasons relating to potential weaknesses in the underlying evidence than they 
did reasons indicating that they wished to “punish” the prosecutor. 
 203. It is theoretically possible to construct an experiment that can determine the 
magnitude of the weight jurors give to motivational inferences regarding a party’s trial 
strategy. An experimenter could attempt to create a Bayesian model of optimal juror deci-
sionmaking with respect to hearsay evidence and compare it against the weight that jurors 
actually afford the evidence. Such an experiment has its own challenges, however. For exam-
ple, it would be difficult to calculate the prior probabilities crucial to a Bayesian analysis.  
 204. See Dunning, supra note 55, at 481; Fein et al., supra note 68, at 1220. 
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a more subtle action: the decision to proffer hearsay instead of the 
declarant’s in-court testimony. 
 The results reported in this Article also add to past research on 
how jurors perceive legal actors who appear to be “hiding” or omitting 
evidence. Prior research suggests that defendants who invoke the 
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination are judged by ju-
rors as more likely to be guilty than defendants who do not.205 Fur-
ther, jurors are more likely to convict defendants who appear less 
than forthcoming, even if they do not invoke the Fifth Amendment.206
Similarly, it appears that jurors view the strategic choice to proffer 
hearsay for a suspect purpose as a way of “hiding” probative weak-
nesses in the underlying evidence, and jurors weigh the hearsay evi-
dence consistent with this suspicion.  
 The findings reported in this Article also contribute to researchers’ 
understanding of juror behavior more generally. Although research 
suggests that jurors engage in potentially irrational decisionmaking 
at various stages of trial,207 researchers have also found consistently 
that the single best predictor of jury verdicts is what we would expect 
it to be: the weight of the evidence.208 The studies reported in this Ar-
ticle showcase another area in which jurors appear to make rational 
decisions: when evaluating hearsay evidence. Beyond that, this study 
suggests that juries consider an attorney’s strategic choices in ways 
that the law may not appreciate fully. It is not obvious that policy-
makers expect juries to evaluate a party’s strategy for proffering 
hearsay evidence when weighing the evidence. Yet that is what they 
appear to do. 
 These findings have implications for how jurors process evidence 
beyond the context of hearsay. The studies reported in this Article 
suggest that jurors prefer direct evidence to circumstantial evidence. 
They also suggest that jurors think critically when evaluating “less-
er” forms of evidence. Perhaps these findings also suggest that par-
ties should be given greater freedom to present their cases to a jury 
in the manner they deem the most effective and persuasive. To the 
extent parties proffer weaker evidence in support of trial facts, the 
legal system may be best served by trusting the jury to give this 
weaker evidence less weight.  
                                                                                                                  
 205. See Hendrick & Shaffer, supra note 16. 
 206. See Shaffer et al., supra note 94, 1238-40. 
 207. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 20, at 185; Diamond & Levi, supra note 23, 
at 225; Hazelwood & Brigham, supra note 21, at 710-12. 
 208. See NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN JURIES: THE VERDICT 150 (2007). 
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2. The Hearsay Doctrine 
 The data presented in this Article, coupled with past empirical 
data on hearsay, suggest that the normative conversation among pol-
icymakers over the propriety of the hearsay doctrine should change. 
The argument for barring hearsay evidence at trial rests on several 
rationales.209 As other scholars have argued, one of the touchstone 
arguments for disallowing hearsay evidence at trial is the concern 
that jurors are insensitive to factors that might cause hearsay to be 
unreliable.210 For example, because the out-of-court declarant usually 
is not cross-examined, jurors may fail to appreciate that the declar-
ant may have lied, may have been biased, or may simply have been 
mistaken when she made her statement. Similarly, although the 
hearsay witness can be cross-examined, jurors may still fail to appre-
ciate fully the possibility that the witness may be lying, biased, or 
mistaken about the declarant’s statement.  
 Prior research suggests, however, that jurors are skeptical of 
hearsay evidence and consider shrewdly the effects of cognitive fac-
tors such as age and time on the reliability of hearsay statements.211
The experiments reported in this Article suggest that jurors are also 
“motivationally intelligent” consumers of hearsay. When jurors can-
not discern the strategy behind a party’s choice to proffer hearsay 
evidence, they grow skeptical of the evidence and discount it accord-
ingly. Thus, the empirical data with respect to how jurors perceive 
hearsay trends largely in one direction: jurors think much more criti-
cally about hearsay than the law currently recognizes.212
 If the belief that jurors incompetently evaluate hearsay evidence 
does not withstand empirical scrutiny, policymakers should consider 
peeling away, “like layers on an onion,”213 this empirically untenable 
argument and refocus the debate on philosophical and democratic 
objections. For example, we might worry that allowing hearsay evi-
dence to be admitted at trial may discredit the judiciary in the eyes of 
the public,214 may lead to unfair surprise,215 may lead to inconsistent 
verdicts,216 or may delay the finality of verdicts.217
                                                                                                                  
 209. See, e.g., Nesson, supra note 36, at 1372-73; Park, supra note 35, at 1057-60. 
 210. See, e.g., Landsman & Rakos, supra note 26, at 70-72. 
 211. See Dunlap et al., supra note 53, at 25; Pathak & Thompson, supra note 52, at 372-74. 
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 213. Thompson & Pathak, supra note 33, at 470. 
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 216. See Park, supra note 35, at 1064 (referring to Nesson’s suggestion that the hear-
say rules support stable verdicts). 
 217. Nesson, supra note 36, 1372-75. Interestingly, many of these philosophical and 
democratic objections make untested empirical claims about the behavior of litigants, fact-
finders, and the public. 
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 It may serve hearsay policymakers well to focus the normative 
conversation about hearsay on the value of confrontation, which some 
scholars have argued should be the sole rationale for the hearsay 
bar.218 The Supreme Court has recently breathed new life into the 
Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause in a series of cases examin-
ing the hearsay doctrine. In a series of decisions over the past decade, 
the Court has clarified that, apart from the various rationales under-
lying the exclusion or admission of hearsay evidence, a defendant has 
an absolute constitutional right under the Sixth Amendment to cross-
examine her accuser if the accuser makes an out-of-court, testimonial 
statement against the defendant.219 If the defendant cannot do so, 
then the court must exclude the hearsay statement.220 The future of 
the hearsay debate may likely turn on these important constitutional 
issues. However policymakers choose to refocus the normative debate 
over the hearsay doctrine, they should clear out the underbrush.  
The view that jurors do not critically evaluate hearsay evidence lacks  
empirical support. 
3. Trial Practice 
 The experimental results reported in this Article should interest 
trial practitioners. Within guidelines established by rules, statutes, 
and state and federal constitutions, trial attorneys have significant 
freedom to present their case by any means possible. Thus, attorneys 
are confronted with a menu of strategic choices in advocating for 
their clients. There are myriad reasons why a witness may become 
unavailable to testify at trial. During the often lengthy period that 
precedes a trial on the merits, witnesses may die, become ill, move 
away from the jurisdiction, or decide that they do not wish to testify. 
                                                                                                                  
 218. See Park, supra note 35, at 1057-58 (quoting WIGMORE, supra note 26, and ex-
plaining that Wigmore believed that “the essence of the Hearsay rule is a requirement that 
testimonial assertions shall be subjected to the test of cross-examination”). 
 219. See Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011); Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 
(2008); Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
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in later cases. See Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143; Davis, 547 U.S. 813. The Confrontation Clause, 
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The trial attorney is then put in a quandary: if the witness has not 
died but is otherwise unavailable, does the attorney expend re-
sources, including money and time, to ensure that the testimony 
reaches the jury, or does the attorney use hearsay to ensure that the 
evidence reaches the jury, albeit in an indirect way? 
 This study suggests that trial attorneys should conduct a thorough 
cost-benefit analysis when answering that question and that the per-
ceived motivation for proffering a hearsay witness is an important 
variable that trial attorneys must consider carefully. Putting forth 
hearsay evidence is not a costless endeavor. Jurors are likely to dis-
count hearsay evidence compared to a declarant’s in-court testimony. 
When they cannot discern a clear motive for the use of hearsay, or if 
they perceive the motive for using hearsay to be suspect, jurors be-
come suspicious of potential probative flaws in the declarant’s out-of-
court testimony. The results from this study suggest that, if an out-
of-court declarant’s testimony is critical to her case, an attorney 
should spare little expense in procuring the witness if a benign rea-
son for proffering hearsay would not be obvious to the jury.  
 This study also suggests that judges should allow attorneys to ex-
plain to the jury, either in opening or closing statements, their rea-
sons for proffering hearsay. To the extent that allowing an attorney 
to do so falls to the discretion of the trial judge, experimental re-
search suggests that motivation matters—whether it is the motiva-
tion of the defendant, the expert witness, or the attorney.221 Thus, 
trial judges should afford attorneys this freedom to assist the jury in 
making an informed judgment about the evidence presented. If an 
attorney is not permitted to explain her reasons for proffering hear-
say, it would serve her well to make her motivation for proffering 
hearsay clear to the fact finder through other means, including the 
direct- and cross-examination of witnesses. 
 Conclusions on the basis of one experimental Article should be 
modest. In this study, the available declarant was always in the area 
and apparently could have testified if he had been called as a wit-
ness. But how would jurors evaluate a strategic decision to proffer 
hearsay evidence when the declarant is not in the immediate area 
and it would be expensive to procure her testimony? Continued re-
search on the effects of a party’s motivation to proffer hearsay might 
produce a model that provides practitioners with best practices for 
how to put forth evidence in the most effective manner at trial.  
 At least one lesson seems abundantly clear: This study suggests 
that there is a measurable and significant strategic drawback to pre-
senting hearsay or other weaker evidence, even if that evidence has 
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the imprimatur of the Federal Rules. Simply because a party can
proffer evidence does not mean that she should proffer it. 
B.   Caveats and Future Research 
 As with most mock juror experiments, several caveats apply. 
First, mock jurors in this study did not deliberate before rendering 
their verdicts. Some researchers have found that group deliberation 
can affect individual mock juror judgments.222 But Kalven and Zeisel 
have found that by far the best predictor of verdicts rendered by de-
liberating juries is the pre-deliberation judgments of the jury majori-
ty.223 In other words, most jurors’ judgments do not change radically 
as a result of discussion with other jurors. Nonetheless, researchers 
have found consistently that group deliberations can polarize the 
judgments of individual group members.224 It follows that the interac-
tion of motivation and substitution quality observed in the Main Ex-
periment might be even greater in a real-world setting in which ju-
rors deliberate before rendering their verdicts. Thus, the effects of 
group deliberation on juror judgments of a party’s tactical decision to 
use hearsay might be a fruitful area for future research. 
 Second, as with all vignette studies, there is a concern that the 
experimental results may not replicate in real-world trials. The ex-
periments in this Article required participants to read a criminal tri-
al vignette and answer written questions. Ideally, participants would 
observe a real trial (or an authentic trial reenactment) and render 
judgments that participants believe have real consequences to the 
trial participants. Practical concerns, including the potential con-
founds that may arise from using actors to portray trial participants, 
and the ethical problems of placing study participants in a situation 
in which they believe they could send a criminal defendant to prison 
make such ideal experimental designs impractical. Although re-
searchers have found that results obtained in artificial laboratory 
conditions often replicate in real-world situations,225 researchers can 
strengthen their laboratory results by using a variety of experimental 
designs and methods to create convergent validity for their claims. 
 The findings reported in this Article are an important first step in 
understanding the ways in which jurors consider a party’s motivation 
when evaluating hearsay evidence. Researchers should continue to 
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identify contextual factors that affect judgments about hearsay. For 
example, this experiment examined how jurors responded to two dif-
ferent motivations by the prosecutor for proffering hearsay: necessity 
(the “benign” motive) or a desire to shield the declarant from cross-
examination (the “suspect” motive). But a party’s motivation for put-
ting forth hearsay likely falls on a continuum between these ex-
tremes. Future research might examine how jurors respond to other 
types of motivation for proffering hearsay. For example, how would a 
jury view the motivation of a party who puts forth a hearsay witness 
when the declarant is physically available but legally unavailable 
because she invokes an evidentiary privilege? Answers to these ques-
tions will clarify the contexts in which a party’s motivation has the 
greatest effect on mock jurors’ judgments about hearsay. 
 Future researchers might also explore the origins for the tendency 
of jurors to scrutinize a party’s strategy for proffering hearsay. To the 
extent that we believe that jurors think critically about hearsay, do 
they also possess an unconscious aversion to lesser evidence? Or is 
the hearsay bar itself—of which jurors are presumably aware—
causing jurors to be suspicious of the evidence? Researchers might 
answer these questions by comparing American attitudes toward 
hearsay with the attitudes of people from countries that have less 
stringent hearsay rules.226 They might also compare the attitudes of 
participants in administrative hearings—which do not follow the 
rules of evidence and place minimal restrictions on hearsay evi-
dence—with the attitudes of trial participants toward hearsay. 
 The “hoary issue of hearsay”227 provides multiple challenges for 
the empirical researcher. The hearsay doctrine is complex, arguably 
inconsistent, and consists of numerous, sometimes conflicting, ra-
tionales for its existence. But even though empirical examinations of 
hearsay are in their infancy, researchers have made great strides in 
determining the cognitive and motivational factors to which fact 
finders are attuned when presented with this complex evidence. The 
study reported in this Article suggests that a party’s motivation for 
proffering hearsay is an important factor that jurors consider when 
assigning hearsay evidence its probative weight. On a grander scale, 
it also suggests that in contexts—such as the hearsay context—where 
jurors are confronted with weaker evidence when stronger evidence 
is available, we should trust jurors to examine the attendant strate-
gic circumstances that surround the decision to proffer that evidence 
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and trust them to weigh the evidence accordingly. More research in 
this vein will provide informational benefits to judges, juries, attor-
neys, the legal academy, and ultimately the legal system and society 
in which these actors function. 
